

Kulturelle rammebetingelser

En selvfølgelighet kanskje, men like vel: Verken den etiske refleksjonen eller den etiske handlingen finner sted i et vakuum. Begge deler har sine rammebetingelser og sine forutsetninger. Dette gjelder også innenfor for militæretikken. Og på litt forskjellig vis er dette tematisert i dette nummeret av Pacem.

Delegater med røtter i den tredje verden pekte på noen slike rammebetingelser under en stor internasjonal konferanse om humanitær intervensjon i regi av *Life and Peace Institute* i Uppsala for godt og vel 10 år siden, da de fremholdt sin bekymring for mulige utviklingstrekk i kjølevannet av globaliseringstendensene i internasjonal politikk. I dagens politiske situasjon fremstår disse bekymringene nærmest som profetiske:

- Intervensjonsbeslutningen – eller beslutning om bruk av militærmakt – vil i hovedsak være påvirket av eller fattet av stater med lang tradisjon for å dominere og unytte de partene som de intervensjonerer mot. Dette aspektet vil uvegerlig skinne gjennom også når beslutningen fattes av internasjonale organer.
- Grunnlaget for intervensjonen vil i noen grad alltid kunne føres tilbake til problemer skapt gjennom den rike del av verdens politikk overfor den tredje verden. Intervensjon vil på denne bakgrunn lett oppfattes som et redskap for igjen å få situasjonen under kontroll
- Dobbeltmoral og mangel på konsekvens med hensyn til hvor og når det intervensjoneres militært, undergraver verdenssamfunnets troverdighet.
- Militær maktbruk kan aldri bli annet enn en midlertidig og overfladisk løsning. De grunnleggende konfliktene må løses med andre virkemiddel enn militær maktbruk
- Økonomiske, sosiale og politiske forhold må vies større oppmerksomhet. De konstituerer urettferdighet og er som sådan en krenkelse av menneskeverdet

- Intervensjonsstyrkene mangler grunnleggende forståelse for kulturen i det konfliktområdet de intervensjoner i.

En realistisk vurdering av intervensjonens muligheter vil til enhver tid måtte vie disse problemstillingene atskillig oppmerksomhet. En slik prosess vil avdekke at tverrkulturelle barrierer i denne sammenhengen ikke bare handler om eksotiske og fremmede livsytringer i operasjonsområder rundt i verden, men i stor grad også er knyttet til de beslutningsprosessene som går forut for en intervensjon.

PACEM går inn i sin sjette årgang og selv om det første nummeret dette året ikke er av de mest omfangsrike vi har gitt ut, mener vi at det byr på mye god lesning. Og som allerede antydnet innledningsvis: I hovedsak handler dette nummeret om rammebetingelsene for militær yrkesutøvelse.

De to første artiklene har utgangspunkt i Feltprestkorpsets etikk-konferanse i fjor høst – *Norm and Context*: Dr Shannon French foredrag *The Code of the Warrior: Why Warriors Need a Code* og professor Jan Olav Henriksens foredrag *Ethical Contingency: Reflections on Morality as Context Bound*.

Kultur og religion inngår i ikke ubetydelig grad i konflikter verden over. Det er nok å åpne dagsferske aviser for å få dette bekreftet. Dermed blir kultur og ikke minst religionsforståelse i stadig økende grad nødvendige kompetanse for den som skal på et eller annet nivå skal delta i internasjonale militære operasjoner – enten operasjonsområdet ligger i vår egen del av verden eller på den andre siden av kloden. Høgskolerektor Thor Strandenæs og amanuensis Jan Opsal har begge tilhold på Misjonshøgskolen i Stavanger der de underviser i henholdsvis misjonsteologi og religionsvitenskap. Artiklene deres baserer seg på foredrag de holdt under sjøforsvarsprestenes og luftforsvarsprestenes årlige fagkonferanse våren 2002 og omhandler tverrkulturell kommunikasjon (Strandenæs) og islam etter 11 september 2001 (Opsal).

Høgskolelektor ved Norsk Lærerakademi, Jan Rantrud, har bakgrunn som misjonsprest i Tel Aviv og har arbeidet mye med gamle orientalske kirkesamfunn. Han har levert en kort artikkel om forholdet mellom østlige og vestlige tradisjoner i kirken basert på et foredrag han holdt under Feltprestkorpsets og Den norske kirkes presteforenings videreutdanningskurs i interkulturell forståelse.

I tillegg har vi fått tillatelse fra Kirkens Nødhjelp til å trykke fotografen Per-Anders Rosenkvists bilder fra Kosovo sammen med tekster av KNs Balkanrepresentant, Leif Magne Helgesen.

Orlogskaptein Hans Olav Stensli er lærer i internasjonal politikk ved Sjøkrigsskolen og hans artikkel, *The Value of Political Realism*, er et tilsvarende på Raag Rolfsens artikkel fra forrige nummer av PACEM, *Political Realism and the Ethics of Vulnerability: The Need for a New Understanding of Security after September 11*.

Til slutt har Peder Skov-Jacobsen levert en anmeldelse av Lars Fr. H. Svendsens bok *Ondskapens Filosofi*.

God lesning!

Leif Tore Michelsen

The Code of the Warrior: Why Warriors Need a Code^{*}

BY DR. SHANNON E. FRENCH

Warrior cultures throughout history and from diverse regions around the globe have constructed codes of behavior, based on that culture's image of the ideal warrior. These codes have not always been written down or literally codified into a set of explicit rules. A code can be hidden in the lines of epic poems or implied by the descriptions of mythic heroes. One way or another, it is carefully conveyed to each succeeding generation of warriors. These codes tend to be quite demanding. They are often closely linked to a culture's religious beliefs and can be connected to elaborate (and frequently death defying or excruciatingly painful) rituals and rites of passage.

^{*} This is a lecture from the National Conference in Military Ethics in Oslo, October 2002, "Norm and Context."

In many cases this code of honor seems to hold the warrior to a higher ethical standard than that required for an ordinary citizen within the general population of the society the warrior serves. The code is not imposed from the outside. The warriors themselves police strict adherence to these standards; with violators being shamed, ostracized, or even killed by their peers. One historical example comes from the Roman legions, where if a man fell asleep while he was supposed to be on watch in time of war he could expect to be stoned to death by the members of his own cohort.

The code of the warrior not only defines how he should interact with his own warrior comrades, but also how he should treat other members of his society, his enemies, and the people he conquers. The code restrains the warrior. It sets boundaries on his behavior. It distinguishes honorable acts from shameful acts. The Homeric hero Achilles must seek vengeance for the death of his friend Patroclus, yet when his rage drives him to desecrate the corpse of his arch nemesis, Hector, he angers the gods. Under the codes of chivalry, a medieval knight has to offer mercy to any knight who yields to him in battle. In feudal Japan, samurai are not permitted to approach their opponents using stealth, but rather are required to declare themselves openly before engaging combat. Muslim warriors engaged in offensive *jihad* cannot employ certain weapons unless and until their enemies use them first.

But why do warriors need a code that ties their hands and limits their options? Why should a warrior culture want to restrict the actions of its members and require them to commit to lofty ideals? Might not such restraints cripple their effectiveness as warriors? What's wrong with, "All's fair in love and war?" Isn't winning all that matters? Why should any warrior want to be burdened with concerns about honor and shame?

One reason for such warriors' codes may be to protect the warriors themselves from serious psychological damage. To say the least, the things that warriors are asked to do to guarantee their cultures' survivals are far from pleasant. There is truth in the inescapable slogan, "War is hell." Even those few who seem to feel no revulsion at spilling another human being's guts on the ground, severing a limb, slicing off a head, or burning away a face are likely to be affected by the sight of their friends or kinsmen suffering the same fate. The combination of the warriors' own natural disgust at what they must witness in battle and the fact that what they must do to endure and conquer can seem so uncivilized, so against what they have been taught by their society, creates the

conditions for even the most accomplished warriors to feel tremendous self-loathing.

In the introduction to his valuable analysis of Vietnam veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*, psychiatrist Jonathan Shay stresses the importance of

*Understanding (...) the specific nature of catastrophic war experiences that not only cause lifelong disabling psychiatric symptoms but can ruin good character.*¹

Shay has conducted countless personal interviews and therapy sessions with American combat veterans who are part of the Veterans Improvement Program (VIP). His work has led him to the conclusion that the most severe cases of PTSD are the result of wartime experiences that are not simply violent, but which involve what Shay terms the “betrayal of ‘what’s right’.”² Veterans who believe that they were directly or indirectly party to immoral or dishonorable behavior (perpetrated by themselves, their comrades or their commanders) have the hardest time reclaiming their lives after the war is over. Such men may be tortured by persistent nightmares, may have trouble discerning a safe environment from a threatening one, may not be able to trust their friends, neighbors, family members or government, and may have problems with alcohol, drugs, child or spousal abuse, depression and suicidal tendencies. As Shay sorrowfully concludes,

*The painful paradox is that fighting for one’s country can render one unfit to be its citizen.*³

Warriors need a way to distinguish what they must do out of a sense of duty from what a serial killer does for the sheer sadistic pleasure of it. Their actions, like those of the serial killer, set them apart from the rest of society. Warriors, however, are not sociopaths. They respect the values of the society in which they were raised and which they are prepared to die to protect. Therefore it is important for them to conduct themselves in such a way that they will be honored and esteemed by their communities, not reviled and rejected by them. They want to be seen as proud defenders and representatives of what is best about their culture: as heroes, not “baby-killers.”

¹ Jonathan Shay, M.D., Ph.D., *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. xiii.

² Op. cit.

³ Ibid p. xx.

In a sense, the nature of the warriors' profession puts them at a higher risk for moral corruption than most other occupations because it involves exerting power in matters of life and death. Warriors exercise the power to take or save lives, order others to take or save lives, and lead or send others to their deaths. If they take this awesome responsibility too lightly – if they lose sight of the moral significance of their actions – they risk losing their humanity and their ability to flourish in human society.

In his powerful work, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, Lt. Col. Dave Grossman illuminates the process by which those in war and those training for war attempt to achieve emotional distance from their enemies. The practice of dehumanizing the enemy through the use of abusive or euphemistic language is a common and effective tool for increasing aggression and breaking down inhibitions against killing. Grossman notes:

It is so much easier to kill someone if they look distinctly different than you. If your propaganda machine can convince your soldiers that their opponents are not really human but are "inferior forms of life", then their natural resistance to killing their own species will be reduced. Often the enemy's humanity is denied by referring to him as a "gook", "kraut", or "nip".⁴

Like Shay, Grossman has interviewed many U.S. veterans of the Vietnam War. Not all of his subjects, however, were those with lingering psychological trauma. Grossman found that some of the men he interviewed had never truly achieved emotional distance from their former foes, and seemed to be the better for it. These men expressed admiration for Vietnamese culture. Some had even married Vietnamese women. They appeared to be leading happy and productive post-war lives. In contrast, those who persisted in viewing the Vietnamese as "less than animals" were unable to leave the war behind them.

Grossman writes about the dangers of dehumanizing the enemy in terms of potential damage to the war effort, long-term political fallout, and regional or global instability:

Because of [our] ability to accept other cultures, Americans probably committed fewer atrocities than most other nations would have under the circumstances associated with guerrilla warfare in Vietnam. Certainly fewer than was the track record of most colonial powers. Yet still we had our My Lai, and our efforts in that war were profoundly, perhaps fatally, undermined by that single incident.

It can be easy to unleash this genie of racial and ethnic hatred in order to facilitate kill-

⁴ Lt. Col. Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1996, p. 161.

*ing in time of war. It can be more difficult to keep the cork in the bottle and completely restrain it. Once it is out, and the war is over, the genie is not easily put back in the bottle. Such hatred lingers over the decades, even centuries, as can be seen today in Lebanon and what was once Yugoslavia.*⁵

The insidious harm brought to the individual warriors who find themselves swept up by such devastating propaganda matters a great deal to those concerned with the warriors' own welfare. In a segment on the "Clinical Importance of Honoring or Dishonoring the Enemy", Jonathan Shay describes an intimate connection between the psychological health of the veteran and the respect he feels for those he fought. He stresses how important it is to the warrior to have the conviction that he participated in an *honorable* endeavor:

*Restoring honor to the enemy is an essential step in recovery from combat PTSD. While other things are obviously needed as well, the veteran's self-respect never fully recovers so long as he is unable to see the enemy as worthy. In the words of one of our patients, a war against subhuman vermin "has no honor". This is true even in victory; in defeat, the dishonoring absence of human themis [shared values, a common sense of "what's right"] linking enemy to enemy makes life unendurable.*⁶

Shay finds echoes of these sentiments in the words of J. Glenn Gray from Gray's modern classic on the experience of war, *The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle*.⁷ With the struggle of the Allies against the Japanese in the Pacific Theater of World War II as his backdrop, Gray brings home the agony of the warrior who has become incapable of honoring his enemies and thus is unable to find redemption himself:

*The ugliness of a war against an enemy conceived to be subhuman can hardly be exaggerated. There is an unredeemed quality to battle experienced under these conditions, which blunts all senses and perceptions. Traditional appeals of war are corroded by the demands of a war of extermination, where conventional rules no longer apply. For all its inhumanity, war is a profoundly human institution (...). This image of the enemy as beast lessens even the satisfaction in destruction, for there is no proper regard for the worth of the object destroyed (...). The joys of comradeship, keenness of perception, and sensual delights [are] lessened (...). No aesthetic reconciliation with one's fate as a warrior [is] likely because no moral purgation [is] possible.*⁸

By setting standards of behavior for themselves, accepting certain restraints, and even "honoring their enemies", warriors can create a lifeline that will allow

⁵ Ibid. p. 163.

⁶ Shay p. 115.

⁷ Op. cit.

⁸ J. Glenn Gray, *The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle*, New York: Harper and Row, 1970, pps. 152-153.

them to pull themselves out of the hell of war and reintegrate themselves into their society, should they survive to see peace restored. A warrior's code may cover everything from the treatment of prisoners of war to oath keeping to table etiquette, but its primary purpose is to grant nobility to the warriors' profession. This allows warriors to retain both their self-respect and the respect of those they guard.

Some may prefer to establish the importance of a warrior's code without reference to the interests of the warriors themselves. It is in fact more conventional to defend the value of a warrior's code by focusing on the needs of society, rather than the needs of warriors as individuals. These are well-intentioned attempts to provide warriors with an external motivation to commit to a code. One such approach has been presented in military ethics circles as "the function argument."

The central thesis of the function argument is that men and women of bad character cannot function well as soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines. This claim is based on the unique demands of military service. Those who support the function argument point out that comrades-in-arms must be able to trust one another in order to be effective; they must be willing to behave selflessly and sacrifice themselves for the good of the mission; and they must embody "the virtues of courage, obedience, loyalty and conscientiousness"⁹ when the stakes are at their highest.

The function argument is useful, as far as it goes. It highlights the unique demands of military service that seem to require special virtues or moral commitments. However, because it links the motive for ethical behavior to military effectiveness, the function argument cannot, by itself, provide reasons for the warrior to behave well in situations where bad behavior does not seem to have a negative impact on the function of the military.

Indeed, the function argument (again, considered *by itself*) gives no guarantee against the conclusion that it makes no difference how warriors behave *even in the military context*, so long as their behavior does not in fact cause them to fail to function effectively in their specific martial roles. That moral failings such as selfishness or a tendency to manipulate the truth could lead to functional failure is irrelevant. Only the actual consequences matter. The argument does not hinge on the acceptance of specific concepts of good character

⁹ Ibid. p. 64.

or moral absolutes. It is contingent upon the validity of certain empirical claims about the real world. If a particular warrior were to prove that he can function effectively and get his job despite having despicable character flaws, the function argument alone would not present him with any reason to improve himself.

A further concern I have regarding the function argument is that it only considers warriors as means to an end, namely the end of protecting the nation. I realize that this is due to the argument's structure, and not the result of any lack of compassion on the part of its authors or proponents. Yet it is a fault nonetheless. Immanuel Kant charged that every rational being is bound by a categorical imperative "to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always as an end in itself and never merely as a means."¹⁰ The word "merely" in this formulation must not be overlooked. Of course warriors are the means by which the nation is defended. To treat them as *mere* means, however, would be to fail to recognize that they are also citizens of the nation and human beings whose value is not limited to their utility as warriors. Although they may enjoy fewer liberties than their civilian counterparts, warriors retain their inalienable rights and deserve to be granted a full measure of dignity and respect.

This brings us back to my earlier line of reasoning. It is not enough to ask, "Can our warriors still get the job done if they do not have a code?" We must also consider the related question: "What will getting the job done do to our warriors if they do not have a code?" Accepting certain constraints as a moral duty, even when it is inconvenient or inefficient to do so, allows warriors to hold onto their humanity while experiencing the horror of war – and, when the war is over, to return home and reintegrate into the society they so ably defended. Fighter who cannot say, "this far but no farther", who have no lines they will not cross and no atrocities from which they will shrink, may be effective. They may complete their missions, but they will do so at the loss of their humanity.

Those who are concerned for the welfare of our warriors would never want to see them sent off to face the chaotic hell of combat without something to ground them and keep them from crossing over into an inescapable heart of darkness. A mother and father may be willing to give their beloved son or

¹⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*.

daughter's *life* for their country or cause, but I doubt they would be as willing to sacrifice their child's *soul*. The code is a kind of moral and psychological armor that protects the warrior from becoming a monster in his or her own eyes.

Nor is it just "see-the-whites-of-their-eyes" front-line ground and Special Forces troops who need this protection. Men and women who fight from a distance – who drop bombs from planes and shoot missiles from ships or submarines – are also at risk of losing their humanity. What threatens them is the very ease by which they can take lives. As technology separates individuals from the results of their actions, it cheats them of the chance to absorb and reckon with the enormity of what they have done. Killing fellow human beings, even for the noblest cause, should never feel like nothing more than a game played using the latest advances in virtual reality.

In his book *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*, Michael Ignatieff airs his concerns about the morality of asymmetric conflicts in which one side is able to inflict large numbers of casualties from afar without putting its own forces at much risk (e.g. by relying primarily on long-range precision weapons and high-altitude air assaults). In such a mismatched fight, it may be easy for those fighting on the superior side to fail to appreciate the true costs of the war, since they are not forced to witness the death and destruction first-hand. Ignatieff warns modern warriors against the "moral danger" they face if they allow themselves to become too detached from the reality of war:

*Virtual reality is seductive. (...) We see war as a surgical scalpel and not a bloodstained sword. In so doing we mis-describe ourselves as we mis-describe the instruments of death. We need to stay away from such fables of self-righteous invulnerability. Only then can we get our hands dirty. Only then can we do what is right.*¹¹

I have argued that it can be damaging for warriors to view their enemies as sub-human by imagining them like beasts in a jungle. In the same way, modern warriors who dehumanize their enemies by equating them with blips on a computer screen may find the sense that they are part of an honorable undertaking far too fragile to sustain. Just as societies have an obligation to treat their warriors as ends in themselves, it is important for warriors to show a similar kind of respect for the inherent worth and dignity of their opponents. Even long-distance warriors can achieve this by acknowledging that some of the "targets"

¹¹ Michael Ignatieff, *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond*, New York: Picador USA (Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company), 2000, pps. 214-215.

they destroy are in fact human beings, not demons or vermin or empty statistics.

More parallels can be drawn between the way that societies should behave towards their warriors and how warriors should behave towards one another. Societies should honor their fallen defenders. Warriors should not desecrate the corpses of their enemies, but should, whenever possible, allow them to be buried by their own people and according to their own cultural traditions. Among his therapy patients, Jonathan Shay found several veterans suffering from “the toxic residue left behind by disrespectful treatment of enemy dead.”¹² And while societies must certainly show concern for the after-effects of war on their own troops, victorious warriors can also maintain the moral high ground by helping to rebuild (or in some cases create) a solid infrastructure, a healthy economy, an educational system, and political stability for their former foes.

These imperatives I have put forward apply to relations among warriors and nations defended by warriors. The moral requirements become much murkier when warriors must battle murderers.

The warriors of today will increasingly find themselves pitted against adversaries who fight without any rules or restraints. Because they see no other way to advance their objectives, these desperate men and women are likely to employ methods that are rightfully viewed as horrific and appalling by the rest of the civilized world, such as terror attacks on civilian populations. They will take “fighting dirty” to unimaginable depths, and since they are already willing to die, they will not be deterred by any threat of punishment for continuing to disregard the laws of war.

As Ariel Merari, director of the Project on Terrorism at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University points out in his essay, “The Readiness To Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East”, old ideas about tit-for-tat and the applications of rational decision theory are worthless when dealing with those who are ready – if not anxious – to sacrifice their lives for The Cause. Merari quotes Lord Chalfont, an authority on counter-terrorism:

The whole time that I have been involved in terrorist operations, which now goes back to 30 years, my enemy has always been a man who is very worried about his own skin. You can no longer count on that, because the terrorist [today] is not just prepared to get

¹² Shay p.117.

*killed, he wants to get killed. Therefore, the whole planning, tactical doctrine, [and] thinking [behind antiterrorism measures] is fundamentally undermined.*¹³

How should stronger sides in asymmetric conflicts respond when their weaker opponents resort to terrorist tactics? One perfectly understandable reaction would be for the stronger sides to want to “take off the gloves” too, especially when the terrorists seem to be banking on the fact that they will not. It seems natural to say, “If they will not respect the rules of war and use some restraint, then neither will we.”

Of course, one of the most serious “cons” that the West must consider before “taking the gloves off” is that it would be a violation of our own values to engage in a war with no rules. It is beyond infuriating that some of the people who claim to hate who we are and what we represent are yet able to benefit from our commitment to restraint. The more they push us and the more suffering we endure, the harder it is for us to fight with one hand tied behind our back rather than unleashing the full extent of our power to wipe them from the earth. But if we give up who we are in order to destroy our enemies, what sort of victory will we have secured for ourselves? Even the noblest of ends can be tarnished if base means are used to achieve them.

It is truly disturbing to consider how easy it may be for a person to rationalize the terrible transition from warrior to murderer. An individual may be persuaded to become a murderer by a single charismatic personality, by a group or movement that answers some psychological need, or by the effects of a traumatic event (such as witnessing the death of a close friend or family member). I must stress that the line between a warrior and a murderer is profoundly important, but very thin. Once it has been crossed, the harm to the individual may be irrevocable.

A student in a seminar called “Knowing Your Enemy” that I taught in the spring of 2002 raised the issue in class of whether a warrior who had crossed the line and allowed himself to become a murderer could ever find redemption and, in a sense, regain his warrior status. My response is that it depends a great deal on the individual’s own reaction to having crossed that line. If he refuses

¹³ Ariel Merari, “The readiness to kill and die: Suicidal terrorism in the Middle East”, in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, edited by Walter Reich, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998, p. 193.

to examine the immorality of his actions, he may start down a slippery slope that is difficult to escape. He may tell himself that it was naïve ever to have clung to a code – that there is no real difference between, for example, killing an enemy combatant in the thick of a firefight and killing an unarmed civilian in cold blood. On the other hand, if he rejects his ignoble behavior rather than excusing it, he may be able to restore his sense of honor and renew his commitment to the path of restraint.

In 1989, my father had a conversation with a World War II fighter pilot who knew first-hand what it feels like both to see an enemy cross the line from warrior to murderer and, in response, to cross that same line yourself. He described the experience that had haunted him for over forty years:

Three ME-109s came at us from out of the sun. It was one hell of a dogfight. Jimmy Craig was hit and bailed out. He was up there in his chute, settling down easy, when this Kraut pulls away and takes dead aim at Jimmy. I couldn't believe it. You never shoot a guy hanging in a chute. But that's what he did. He cut him in half. I swung round on that bastard's tail and picked at him until he bailed out. His chute opened. I watched him floating there just like Jimmy. I wanted to see his eyes. But he had goggles on. Then I shot that son of a bitch out of the sky.

How'd it feel? My father asked him.

It felt good.

Really? ...Well, you were there.

No... Okay, ...I cried.¹⁴

It is easier to remain a warrior when fighting other warriors. When warriors fight murderers, they may be tempted to become the mirror image of the evil they hoped to destroy. Their only protection is their code of honor. The professional military ethics that restrain warriors – that keep them from targeting those who cannot fight back, from taking pleasure in killing, from striking harder than is necessary and that encourage them to offer mercy to their defeated enemies and even to help rebuild their countries and communities – are also their own protection against becoming what they abhor.

Legend has it that when a Spartan mother sent her son off to war she would say to him, “Come back with your shield or on it.” If a warrior came back

¹⁴ Peter A. French, *Responsibility Matters*, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992, p. 29.

without his shield, it meant that he had laid it down in order to break ranks and run from battle. He was supposed to use his shield to protect the man next to him in formation, so to abandon his shield was not only to be a coward but also to break faith with his comrades. To come back on his shield was to be carried back either wounded or dead. Thus the adage meant that the young warrior should fight bravely, maintain his martial discipline, and return with both his body and his honor intact.

The warriors' mothers who spoke this line were not heartless monsters – far from it. It was spoken from great love. They wanted their children to return with their sense of self-respect still with them, feeling justifiably proud of how they had performed under pressure, not tortured and destroyed by guilt and shame. To come back with their shields was to come back still feeling like warriors, not like cowards or murderers.

The Spartan mothers' message is timeless. Everyone who cares about the welfare of warriors wants them not only to live through whatever fighting they must face, but also to have lives worth living after the fighting is done. Consider the post-war sentiments found in the closing lines of the poem "Old Airfield", written by World War II veteran Andrew H. Hines, Jr.:

*The crescendo built – a war was won and men came home,
Came home to lives completely changed –
as they were changed.*

Came back to love and warmth and the prospects of a life stretching beyond a day or two.

*So life resumed its pace –
different, but still within their knowledge of its ways.*

*The years went by, the burdens were assumed, the responsibilities grew
And seldom did they stop to think of the intensity and commitment they had known.*

*But on occasion, as lightning brightens the sky, some word or headline brought it back
And they knew for a moment the heightened stress –*

and then relaxed and resumed their way.

And, like old airfields, found in new ways the fulfillment of dreams

And the sense of being part of a larger plan –

*as once they were so long ago.*¹⁵

“Come back with your shield or on it.” Andy Hines came back with his shield. For many reasons, not all warriors do. Some are never able to leave the horror of war behind them. Their bodies come home alive, but their faith in themselves, their dreams, and their hopes for the future are long dead. Had they been given the choice, they may have preferred not to come home at all.

The warriors’ code is the shield that guards our warriors’ humanity. Without it, they are no good to themselves or to those with whom and for whom they fight. Without it, they will find no way back from war. My students are the warriors of the future. When and if they go into combat, I want them to be able to return from it intact in body *and* soul. I want all of them, every last one, to come back with their shields.

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¹⁵ Andrew H. Hines, Jr., “Old Airfield”.

“Knowing Your Enemy”. In 2000 she was awarded USNA’s campus-wide Apgar Award for Excellence in Teaching for demonstrating “effectiveness in teaching the qualities of leadership, with special emphasis on character, responsibility, and integrity.”

Ethical Contingency: Ref- lections on Morality as Con- text Bound^{*}

BY PROFESSOR, DR. JAN-OLAV HENRIKSEN

Introduction. Underlying issues

The notion of contingency in the title of this article is not arbitrary. Anyone working with ethics and moral philosophy should be aware that there are different kinds of contingencies involved in what we hold or develop as our ethical position. The awareness of contingency is important – it helps us keep in mind that things could be different, that there exists the possibility of thinking differently than we do. This is even more important when we reflect on the last part of the title: morality as context bound. Especially when we realize that morality in some way or another is context bound, we need to face the challenge that our position – the one recognized as context bound – could be otherwise. However, please note that this does not mean that it should be otherwise – that is a completely different issue.

^{*} This is a lecture from the National Conference in Military Ethics in Oslo, October 2002, “Norm and Context.”

Already these preliminary remarks give us an indication that there are a lot of issues involved in the topic I have been asked to address. Let me then first of all list some of them:

The realization of contingency by no means indicates that a moral position based on contingencies could be exchanged for any other. To face contingencies is not to exclude the reasons that we have for holding a moral position, rather, it situates the reasons we have in a certain context.

Moreover, this implies that both reasons and contexts could be different. Usually, we can exchange or develop the reasons we have for a position, but not the context in and for which we develop it. For instance, it has not much meaning for you to try to develop a military ethics that is related to the Afghan or Japanese context, but it has a lot of meaning if you try to develop it for and within the Norwegian context. However, the reasons you develop and the solutions you suggest to the tasks you identify, is closely related to the context within which you find yourself. That, however, does not exclude the possibility that a Japanese or Afghan moral philosopher would find many of your arguments relevant, illuminating, and good. But many of the conditions for his or her use or not use of this, would be related to the context and the problems he/she was facing.

To arrive to the conclusion that our moral position *should* be otherwise, usually presuppose either a) that we are not able to come to terms with present ethical problems on the terms existing for solving that problem, or b) that we are presented with reasons and/or opinions that shed new light on our hitherto held positions, challenging them. In the last instance, this usually follows from being faced with a position that transcends the context in which our hitherto held morality is situated and argued for.

I hold that the realization of the different contingencies implied behind the formation of our ethical positions should oblige us to expose our position to other contexts and reasons than those we are already familiar with. To expose our position to other contexts is a good way of identifying our own blind spots. It is also a way to de-familiarize our opinion in such a way that we do not immediately take it for granted. Hence the realization of contextually bound elements in our own ethics should not immediately lead us to the attempt to try to avoid or transcend anything that is contaminated by context. Rather it should mean that we strive for allowing several different and contextually based approaches to challenge our own. That would not only deepen our un-

derstanding of the reasons we have behind our position, but would also clarify our potential ignorance at points that we may not have given sufficiently attention to.

By saying this, I also want to argue that this does not imply that any position is just as good as anyone else, since everything is contextually situated anyway. The bottom line of such an argument would be that Osama bin Laden's way of reasoning would be just as good as Kjell Magne Bondevik's or Tony Blair's, or at the same level as George Bush's. However, also George Bush cannot simply state that his morality is better off because he is not a terrorist, as long as he is not able to face and defend himself against some of the challenges that the US are confronted with regarding their policy in the Middle East. We do not decide which morality is the best by comparing our merits with those of others, we are also obliged to state the *reasons* behind our morality and say on what basis we think that is also integrates the interests of those presenting themselves as our opponents.

The conclusion of this introduction would then be to say that surely, our morality is bound to contextual conditions. That however, is and can *by no means* provide us with a sufficient justification for a moral position. It is how we relate to those outside the context that proves the true content of our morality. However, all of this is another story. I am asked to talk about contingencies. But you should have a fair idea of where I stand as I now continue on that path. I am by no means a dedicated contextualist, but have learned a lot from people as different as Jürgen Habermas and Jeffery Stout on this. They combine the realization of how we are shaped by our life-world, with the necessity of being confronted with concrete others that are not of the same opinion as myself.

How are our moral positions contextually bound?

Let me start with one example¹⁶ of how morality is context bound. 10 years ago I lived in the western part of Norway, where you are very much dependent upon ferries for communication. One day I was in a hurry, and had to drive to the nearest ferry as rapid as possible. On the way there, just some 3 kilometers before arriving, I had to overtake a car driving very slowly. I reached the ferry

¹⁶ This is taken from my book, *På grensen til Den andre*, Oslo, 1999.

just in time, – as did the car I had passed on the way. Later the same week I had lunch with some colleagues and told them what I had experienced with the slow driver, how I had to take a chance by overtaking the other car just after Barstadvik on my way to Festøy. Others had had the same experience. One of my colleagues, of local origin, turned very silent before he finally said: Here at Søre Sunnmøre it is considered to jump the queue to overtake a car after Bars-tadvik.

The example shows how you need to have knowledge of more than just a rule or norm to act in accordance with what is expected of you in that context. At the same time, it illustrates very well how this morality is context bound: you have to know the local customs as well as the local places in order to act accordingly. The rule “You shall not jump the queue” is without meaning unless you know where the queue starts. And how do you know? How do you know that it applies to anyone? How do you know if and when it is allowed for exceptions (for coaches, ambulances etc.)?

One could argue that what I experienced was just one way of giving the rule “you shall not jump the queue” an application. But there is more to it: I knew that rule, but did not know how it was applied. The content and practice that the rule prescribes is here given a very specific application. So in order to really know what the rules imply, you have to know the context as well.

The local application did serve another purpose as well: it put me very efficiently outside the group of those locals who knew the context, and accordingly, how to behave. Since the rule was given quite specific conditions related to that very place, is also served as a device for social demarcation. Those having their identities defined by a set or rules for behavior are very easily led to manifest and maintain their identity by promoting those rules. Contextual rules are thus not only there in order to make people do the right thing, but in order to manifest what it means to be a true Sunnmøring, Norwegian etc. This function, which I would propose to call the identity function, is necessary to differentiate from the moral function, but I think that we have to realize that this is an element often implied in the ethical way of practicing a rule is related to the local community for which it serves as an identity marker.

I want to pursue the example even further. If I wanted to be a good Sunnmøring that would be a motivation for me practicing the rule in the local version. Hence, the context would offer me the motivation (as well as the identity) for a specific way of behavior. To be brave is a good virtue being a soldier,

but not necessarily when you are a medical doctor treating patients. Hence, virtues as well as motivations are context bound.

Summing up this so far, we can say that: Contextual ethical theories claims that ethical validity, content and motivation is dependent only upon its context, i.e., the social, cultural or religious context. Such theories need not in principle be relativistic in any other sense than that they claim that morality always is conditioned by social and/or religious suppositions and is relative to them. Often, however, moral contextualism is taken to be a support for normative ethical relativism, i.e., as a way of arguing that there is no ethics that is valid inter-culturally or inter-religiously. (Cf. Bexell, Grenholm: Teologisk Etik, 67).

What stuff is morality made of? Digging into the context.

As humans, we are not alone, and our morality is intrinsically shaped also by our relationship to other people. It is not like we first are humans, and then become moral humans, it is more like we are first related to others in the social world, and morality makes this relation human. Morality is not an option – it is something given with life itself, with the vulnerability and the challenges presented to us. You cannot think of any human being who has not in some way or another developed his/her moral skills and abilities to perceive the world in a human way without a social basis in the community with other people.

Hence we are well advised to think the human being as basically social when we address him/her as a moral being. The development of moral capacities are consequently intrinsically linked to the development of other emotional and mental abilities. During the process of socialization the child grows into a world of shared resources for understanding and dealing with the world. We call this shared world for the life-world of the subject.

The life-world is an undifferentiated web of language, customs and habits, patterns for action, practices and, tradition(s). It is obvious from this description that what is present here, is what we take for granted, that within, with and by which we are able to partake without questions and questioning in a world that we have in common with others. As long as everybody we know speaks the same language as us, we need neither to learn another nor to be aware of possible differences from the way other people speak. We do take the content of the life-world that we share with others for granted.

If we look a little bit more closely, this means that in a certain sense our life-world is the first context of morality. I speak here of morality as something practical and practiced, more than theoretical and reflected. However, we cannot identify context totally with life-world. The life-world offers us conditions for how we think and resources for how to approach moral issues, sometimes also practices with moral content or relevance. But it does not in itself give us an ability to act as ethically competent. Let me, in spite of the fact that it is a little daring, tell you why I think this is so:

As long as we act out of habit or custom, we act “because that is what we have learned”, “because others do the same”, even “because I was given orders to do so” etc. we have not turned the *causes* that we have into something that we question, but act merely on reflex. The moral content can be well enough, but there is a more or less causational link between life-world and action, so that we cannot really say that we act on principle or on reasons.

By describing the background of a potential moral action in this way, I play on the distinction between reasons and causes. Causes are external and not always transparent to us, while reasons are internal and something that we have made our own by our own way of thinking. Moral discussion is usually a discussion of reasons, and not of causes. As humans, we act freely (and, I would add, morally) when we act based on reasons. Then we are able to give others ethical reasons why we do what we do. We do not then do it because we have learned it, but because we have an insight into the goodness of that action of its outcome, we do not do it because others do it, but based on our own convictions and judgment, and we do not follow the order because someone told us to, but out of our own estimation of its moral content. Morality searches for moral reasons, and not for external causes.

This can be rephrased in another way as well: when we act morally, we address others and ourselves as individuals capable of developing a common understanding of what is at stake. When you order someone to do something, you do not see him or her as anything else than a strategic means to reach a desired end. But a genuinely moral point of view seeks to formulate a common understanding of why this goal should be reached, and forbids us to use another person just as a means (as many will know from knowledge about Immanuel Kant). So you can choose either to use the other as an external means for your cause, and hence cause him to do something, or you can seek to share your reasons with him in such a way that he does what you think is necessary out of his own will. Hence there is a parallel between understanding, reasons and

freedom on the one hand, and strategic action, causation and neglect of human understanding on the other. Morality is shaped by the first, and is constantly threatened by the second.

In order to develop understanding you need language. Without language, morality as a reason-based activity would very soon die. It is as communicating individuals that we transmit insights into reasons, and offers each other insights into our reasons for acting like we do. It is also by means of language that we can challenge already given and/or taken-for-granted positions in our moral context. I will return to the later, but first of all address some of the ways in which language is giving our moral context its shape.

A very apparent way of learning the moral skills demanded of us in a certain context is to tell stories. Narratives give us the opportunity to both imagine a specific context, as well as engage fantasy, imagination, emotions and rationality in the situation they present us. If you want to know how narratives shape our moral perception, the story of the Good Samaritan present itself as an obvious example. Anyone who has heard that story perceives of the one in need as (a) one that is in need, and (b) one who he/she is obliged to help. Narratives are very important for the formation of our moral apparatus of perception, for good or for bad. If you have been told stories of heroism where the most important thing is to stand unaffected by the suffering of others, or not to engage in them with your own feelings, you are more worse off morally than if you were facing them with empathy and concern. You should note that this is not a position based on sheer contingency, but on a certain understanding of who we are as humans (independent and individually self-based, or relational, with lives interwoven).

One thing is that by way of narratives we learn how to perceive of the situation with a moral understanding of the world. Another is that narratives – since they in a certain way also involve us – also provide us with a specific self-understanding. This self-understanding is not morally neutral. It identifies who you are – often who you are in difference to others. If you are a Serb, the stories you have heard about Serbian history not only tells you how to understand yourself and your nation, but it also makes it harder for you to identify with e.g., Moslems who live in another part of town. One of the problems linked to these contingencies, is that they make it harder to establish a “we” (a common identity) that can overcome injustice, hatred and division. Such stories also contribute to the shaping of our conceptual patterns. It is not given (hence a con-

tingency) how we should relate to “the other” – we can do that in a negative, or in a way recognizing the others human dignity.

We need not go to former Yugoslavia to find examples of this. Think about how former Norwegian generations had trouble in accepting Germans. The historical experiences linked to WW II have provided a lot of contextually informed material for developing moral positions, some good, others bad. One of those most important, I think, is the way the Holocaust made many people say: never again, and led to an active effort in order to overcome the conditions that could lead to that kind of terror.

But what seems a just cause in one instance need not legitimate any given moral position thereafter. I guess many have been puzzled by how former Norwegian freedomfighters, who really stood up for their country and fought to defeat Nazism, then turned very right-wing and some even defended a policy hostile to any kind of immigration. This is illuminating as to how what seems right in one context (to protect one’s country) can be done in ways that are to be judged utterly wrong in another time and under different circumstances. Have we, as moral philosophers, anything to say in order to solve such – at least apparent – contradictions in morality?

I have already partially presented one. Morality is best developed when it is based on an *inclusive* we, where no one is excluded from participating. It is exactly a non-exclusive we that made it necessary to fight Nazism (Jews and others were not included), and it is the very same attempts of shaping a social world that makes it necessary to address ethnic cleansing and some elements hostile to immigrating with moral criticism.

By establishing an inclusive “we”, we transcend the boundaries of a certain context. We do not necessarily put every difference aside – it is still possible to recognize the other as different from me, even with different moral interests. But in order to establish a moral position that comprises both of us, the recognition of difference must interact with the recognition of the other as one who has the same rights and status as me when it comes to moral issues. Hence the context from which we come, be it different or not, is not in itself an argument for the quality in the content of the moral position. An American does not have any kind of moral privilege over an Iraqi *per se*.

This implies that although we take our point of departure morally in the context we come from, we cannot remain there if we are to have what can be qualified as a moral position. We have to defend that position in front of *oth-*

ers, coming from other contexts. Contexts make clear for us a lot about what to look for, but not all. Hence there is an ethical demand that implies that you should take the point of view of the other into consideration. This does not exclude a contextually based position. Neither does it preclude us from returning to the context when it comes to the question of how we are to solve an ethical problem. We must start in context – and return to it if we are to fulfill our moral obligations. However, I will argue for the necessity of a *universalistic purification* as well as contextual application of a moral position. That is necessary in order to overcome the relativistic threats of contextuality. This purification is related to the “we” that we establish. The return to the context can then, however, also mean that after the purification some of the practices in that context, or some of the ways we see things of some of the narratives we tell, become different.

In a modern and pluralist context, we are challenged to develop a kind of double competence: that of self-criticism as well as the ability to take the position of the other (and not just make him into the same as yourself). Our relation to the given moral position that exists in the context within which we find ourselves cannot be one of immediate acceptance, but needs our own critical scrutiny. If this does not happen, the contingencies linked to that context and position remain unchecked. Critical reflection based on the perspectives of others is just as important as holding for true what you find as your own moral position. This willingness to stand for something and at the same time the willingness to let what you stand for be scrutinized by the perspectives of others, implies that we both recognize the contingencies of our own position, and recognize the right of others to have their saying as to what they think of our moral position. The lack of reconciliation is important to maintain in order to make sure that moral reflection does not turn into mere subjective expressions of faith or represents a totally arbitrary position.

I think this double reflexivity (about the contextuality of my own position as well as the right of the other to address my position) serves as a condition for facing the other as an other. Recognition of otherness implies a position where something transcends your own context, a stance that is not fully integrated with the person that relates to it. The conscious awareness of otherness then implies some kind of recognition of a position that is not my own – but this position is still a position that I am able to recognize, and notice the importance of, despite it not being my own, or coming from my context.

A morality based on contextual conditions is thus necessarily a morality with boundaries. We recognize these boundaries by looking past them, thereby also recognizing the contingency of our position. Contingencies in itself is not a problem – it is the stuff morality is made of. The problem is what happens if these contingencies are not recognized. Then they run the danger of being absolutized. When that happens, we run the risk of not seeing the other because our context has made us blind for the differences between him and ourselves. However, as I have tried to say, the recognition of differences, different contexts and different contingencies does not exclude the possibility of establishing a morality based on an inclusive, communal and communicative “we”. But the development of such a morality demands work. However, there is not much of an alternative to such work if we are to take the other – and thus morality itself – seriously.

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Interkulturell kommunikasjon og problemløsning

AV HØGSKOLEREKTOR THOR STRANDENÆS

I samkvem mellom mennesker er det åpenbart at de som er kjent med hverandres kulturer, har bedre forutsetninger for å kommunisere med hverandre enn de som ikke har en slik kulturforståelse. Eksempelvis gjelder det for de som har utviklet språklige ferdigheter og kjennskap til skikk og bruk. Den som har anledning til å reise mye eller oppholde seg lenge blant mennesker i kulturer

som er svært forskjellig fra ens egen, får oftest en større bevissthet om kulturforskjeller og kulturlikheter enn en som bor fast i sin egen kultur gjennom hele livet. Den som er bereist vil normalt også ha utviklet evnen til å registrere likheter og forskjeller mellom kulturene i befolkningsgrupper i eget land, for eksempel mellom øst- og vestlendinger og mellom søringer og folk fra nord i Norge.

Om å knekke kulturkoden

Det som skjer med mennesker som reiser slik, er at de begynner å forholde seg bevisst til folks kulturkode. En kulturkode er det sett av forestillinger, verdier og tradisjoner som danner grunnlaget for ferdigheter, oppfatninger og atferd hos medlemmer av et gitt samfunn. Å knekke kulturkoden, betyr derfor å forstå 'koden i hodet' hos de mennesker som tilhører en kultur. En slik kulturkode innprogrammeres i oss gjennom hele livet. Den bestemmer så vel befolkningsgruppens som enkeltmenneskets tale- og handlingsmønster. Koden ligger i hodet hos enkeltmenneskene, men den kommer til uttrykk når mennesker fra en kultur samtaler eller samhandler med andre innen samme kultur. Den som forstår kulturkoden, forstår samtidig hvorfor menneskene i en gitt kultur taler, handler og tenker som de gjør. Enhver kjennskap til en kultur er bedre enn ingen, men det skal mer enn overflatisk kjennskap til for å knekke kulturkoden. Som regel dreier det seg om å bygge opp kjennskap til en kultur gjennom lang tids erfaringer fra samhandling med personer som tilhører den kulturen. Jo mer bevisst kunnskapen og forståelsen er om en annen kultur, desto større er sjansen for å få til en meningsfull samtale eller annen form for samhandling med representanter for vedkommende kultur. Den som har tilegnet seg innsikt i en kultur, vil lettere la denne kulturens verdier, tradisjoner, handlingsmønstre og overbevisninger få plass i egen bevissthet når det skal føres samtaler eller forhandlinger med enkeltpersoner og grupper som hører denne kulturen til.

På seg selv kjenner man andre

Jo mer bevisst kunnskapen og forståelsen om ens egen kultur er, desto større sjanse er det for at vi skal få en reflektert forståelse av fremmede kulturer. Studiet av egen kultur oppøver en analytisk evne i oss samt bevisstheten om at vår egen kultur er mangfoldig sammensatt. Kulturstudier i vårt land har gjort det helt klart for oss at den såkalte norske enhetskultur var en myte også før Norge ble et flerkulturelt samfunn. Tenk bare på de kulturelle landsdels- og distriktsforskjellene, for ikke å si forholdet mellom majoritets- og minoritetskulturer i vårt land! Det er nok å nevne norske dialekter, julemattradisjoner og forskjeller mellom byene og landsbygdene for å eksemplifisere dette.

Det som kan sies om betydningen av innsikt i og forståelse av egen eller andres kultur(er) i allmennhet, gjelder selvsagt også for det mer spesifikke ved kulturene. Det merker vi når vi beveger oss inn på det området som omfattes av egen eller andres religion, livssyn eller etikk. Da blir behovet for innsikt og forståelse ekstra merkbart. Det henger sammen med at religion, livssyn og etikk bygger på grunnleggende verdier i en kulturen, altså selve nerven i det som får en kultur til å fungere. Uten slik innsikt kan vi risikere å snakke forbi eller misforstå hverandre samt begå alvorlige overtramp eller krenke andre.

Om å unngå at stereotypier får dominere kommunikasjon

Gjennom innsikt i andre kulturer unngår en nemlig at stereotypier om disse får dominere samtale eller annen samhandling med mennesker som tilhører disse kulturene. Stereotypier er i denne sammenheng å forstå som folkelige karikaturer av og faststivnede antakelser om verdier, holdninger og handlingsmønstre i en gitt kultur. Oftest er stereotypier enkle karakteristikker som beveger seg på kulturens overflate og generaliserer. Vi kjenner slike stereotypier fra folkelige karakteristikker som «skotter er gjerrige, svensker er hovne og amerikanere overdriver alltid.» Stereotypier kan være nyttige når de representerer en «første beste gjetning» om en gruppe, og når de blir løpende korrigert ved nye observasjoner. Men, stereotypier er farlige når de er ubevisste og hindrer oss i å justere våre oppfatninger ut i fra møtet med representanter for de respektive kulturene. Hvis nemlig ikke stereotypiene blir korrigert, vil de være til hinder for god kommunikasjon.

Sortering av kulturelle hovedtyper er nyttig

Evnen til å skjelne mellom kulturelle hovedtyper gir bedre forutsetninger for å kunne tolke verbale så vel som nonverbale signaler. Det går for eksempel an å klassifisere kulturer ut i fra om de er såkalte avstands- eller nærhetskulturer og om de er kulturer hvor skam og ære har stor betydning eller ei. Japanerne kan sies å være et eksempel på avstandskultur. Kroppskontakt er ikke vanlig i daglig omgang med mennesker utenfor familien. Øyet iakttar om man overholder kleskoden, holder rett avstand og oppfører seg utad i forhold til det ens formelle posisjon i samfunnet tilsier. I Sør-Europa og Latin-Amerika finner vi mange eksempler på nærhetskulturer, hvor kroppskontakt og omfavnelser anses som naturlig og nødvendig for kommunikasjon med andre mennesker. Hvis to personer som skal kommunisere med hverandre kommer fra henholdsvis avstandskultur og nærhetskultur, vil det lett oppstå misforståelser, og spesielt hvis de ikke er seg det bevisst når de samtaler eller samhandler. Ubevisst kan

man nemlig komme til å krenke samtalepartneren ved enten å unngå kroppskontakt eller berøring helt eller ved å overdrive denne.

Også i møte med ære- og skamkultur er det nødvendig å besinne seg på hva denne kulturkoden definerer som adekvat atferdsmønster. Må en si nei til noen eller avslå en tjeneste, er det ikke nødvendig å såre vedkommende ved ikke å ta hensyn til hva vedkommende kulturkode foreskriver som rett fremgangsmåte. Skal en bedriftsleder for eksempel avsette en underordnet medarbeider, er det fullt mulig å gjøre dette på en slik måte at den som får sparken kan slutte med rak rygg og uten samtidig å miste ansikt. Men, for at vedkommende skal kunne ha sin ære i behold, er det nødvendig at sjefen og øvrige ansatte behandler ham eller henne på en måte som får frem den betydning de har hatt for bedriftens utvikling og for sine arbeidskolleger. I kulturer som vektlegger betydningen av skam og ære er det for eksempel viktig å se andre og selv bli sett. Da blir det å hilse på hverandre når man møtes, viktig. Å hoppe over en slik formalitet, fordi man er travelt opptatt med noe annet eller har dårlig tid, blir i slike kulturer oppfattet som svært uhøflig, ja, det kan endatil virke krenkende på den part som blir oversett. Uansett vil det skape dårlige forutsetninger for at kommunikasjonen i fremtiden skal fungere godt.

Endelig er det forskjell på kulturer som fremhever individet (mer eller mindre) på bekostning av fellesskapet og de kulturer hvor individet helt og holdent forstås ut i fra sin rolle i en større sosial gruppe, som for eksempel familie, slekt, klan, stamme. Mens det i den første typen kulturer er viktig å utvikle selvstendighet i forhold til resten av samfunnet, vil det i den sistnevnte kulturtype være viktig å utvikle evnen til å tilpasse seg et fellesskap, finne sin tildelte rolle der og bidra til fellesskapets beste. De verdier som ligger til grunn for individfokuserte eller gruppefokuserte kulturer vil selvsagt også influere på hvordan mennesker som tilhører hver av disse kulturtypene kommuniserer med hverandre og med andre.

Verbal og nonverbal kommunikasjon

Begynner en først å bli oppmerksom på de mer grunnleggende forskjellene mellom kulturer, åpner dette også gjerne opp for en større forståelse for hvordan verbale og nonverbale signaler fungerer i kommunikasjon. Det er nemlig slik at verbale og nonverbale signaler i ett språk eller én kulturkrets slett ikke betyr det samme innenfor et annet språk eller i en annen kulturkrets. Et 'ja' eller et 'nei' betyr ikke nødvendigvis ja eller nei. Det kan for eksempel bety at jeg sier ja til å komme fordi jeg ikke vil såre deg eller ødelegge forholdet mellom

oss. I virkeligheten har jeg ikke tenkt å komme. Omvendt kan mitt nei bety 'ikke denne gang', 'kanskje en annen gang' eller 'kanskje, hvis det blir andre betingelser'. Med andre ord kan kjennskap til språkbruk og uttrykksmåter i et annet språk hjelpe oss til å forstå hvordan vi bør uttrykke oss for å kommunisere det vi har på hjertet. Særlig er det viktig å være oppmerksom på dette når vi bruker et tredje språk som verken er vårt eget eller samtalepartnerens morsmål. Da vil det for eksempel være fornuftig å uttrykke seg direkte, knapt og konsist på engelsk overfor en tysker, mens en overfor en japaner eller kineser må uttrykke seg mer indirekte og snirklete. I de fleste kulturer er det som ikke blir sagt, også av betydning. Men i noen kulturer er man eksperter på å 'lese mellom linjene'. Det innebærer ekstra store utfordringer for den som vil kommunisere med personer og befolkningsgrupper som tilhører slike kulturer.

På samme måte vil kroppsspråket tillegges større eller mindre betydning, avhengig av om det er kulturer som vektlegger nærhet eller avstand eller som fremhever viktigheten av nonverbal kommunikasjon.

Mening kan ikke overføres, bare signaler

Selv om vi aldri så mye kunne ønske oss at det forholdt seg annerledes, er det i virkeligheten slik at mening ikke overføres, bare verbale og nonverbale signaler. Disse, i sin tur, må tolkes av både sender og mottaker i en kommunikasjonssituasjon, med henblikk på det meningsinnhold de har. Det betyr at mulighetene for misforståelser eller feilkommunikasjon er mange. Bevissthet om 'signaleffekten' øker likevel sjansene for å kunne redusere kildene eller mulighetene for at feilkommunikasjon skal oppstå.

Problemløsning i et flerkulturelt samfunn

Innsikt i og bevissthet om en annen kultur og dens forutsetninger er ikke i seg selv tilstrekkelig for at en vellykket interkulturell kommunikasjon vil finne sted. Det må for eksempel skjelles mellom feilkommunikasjon og saklig uenighet, hvorav det siste kan være uttrykk for god kommunikasjon mens det første ikke er det. Like fullt er det svært viktig å ha størst mulig bevissthet om de ulike kulturkoder som er representert hos samtale- og samhandlingspartene før man tar fatt på problemløsning. Den beste forutsetning for å lykkes med dette, er som regel at man har hatt god kommunikasjon med hverandre før det oppstod problemer. Men, selv hvor dette ikke er tilfelle vil det være mulig å oppnå god interkulturell kommunikasjon. Om man definerer interkulturell kommunikasjon som en vandring over en bro mellom ulike kulturer, er det en viktig betingelse

at en eller begge parter i samtalen virkelig beveger seg ut på broen og benytter den. Dersom det dreier seg om en samtale mellom like store eller tilnærmet like store befolkningsenheter, vil det være en hindring for god kommunikasjon hvis bare den ene part er villig til å bevege seg ut på kulturbroen og forsøke å forstå den annen parts kulturelle forutsetninger. Det trenger likevel ikke umuliggjøre slik kommunikasjon, selv om dens betingelser blir forverret. En annen faktor som spiller inn, er hvor villige partene er til å kommunisere, og hvor viktig eller nødvendig for dem det er å komme i dialog. Det er nemlig et paradoks at selv dyktige kommunikatorer kan ødelegge en dialog, mens tilsynelatende udugelige mennesker kan oppnå stor grad av kommunikasjon og felles forståelse, fordi de er motivert for det. Den beste forutsetning for god interkulturell kommunikasjon og problemløsning er nemlig at man ikke har 'vondt i viljen' men strekker seg langt for å forstå hverandre og bære over med hverandre i en krevende kommunikasjon.

Forfatteren av *Jungelboken*, Rudyard Kipling, hadde etter min mening en altfor pessimistisk innstilling til den interkulturelle kommunikasjons muligheter. Hans slagord ville gjort det umulig for fredsmeklere og misjonærer å oppnå noe som helst: «East is East and West is West and never the Twain shall meet.» Min attenårige erfaring som misjonær i en kinesisk kultur har tydeliggjort for meg at Kiplings antakelse er feil. I Hongkong lærte jeg meg nemlig et annet visdomsord som gir interkulturell kommunikasjon og problemløsning helt andre og mye mer optimistiske forutsetninger. Republikkens grunnlegger, Sun Yat Sen, har nemlig sagt at «Under himmelen er alle én familie». Jeg deler hans oppfatning og mener den bør gi oss frimodighet til å inngå i interkulturell kommunikasjon og problemløsning og ha tro på at dette er mulig og kan gi lykkelige resultater, både i krig og under fredelige forhold. Ikke minst vil en slik innstilling være en viktig betingelse for det fredsbyggende arbeid som vi som kirke og kirkelige medarbeidere er kalt til å utføre!

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11. september 2001 – verden ble ikke en annen

AV JAN OPSAL

Verden er den samme

Jeg er dypt uenig med dem som mener at verden ble en annen etter 11. september 2001, i alle fall dersom en mener at denne datoen vil bli stående som en begivenhet som endret verden på en grunnleggende måte.

For ikke å bli misforstått, jeg var blant dem som ble lammet av sjokket over bildene jeg så på nettet og på TV-nyhetene. Tragedien for dem som ble direkte rammet eller mistet sine nærmeste kan ikke måles. Da det kom fram at kaprerne var arabere og mente at de utførte en gudstjeneste ved terrorhandlingen, visste jeg at dette kom til å sette dype spor i forholdet mellom muslimer og deres naboer verden over.

Men jeg var selv kommet hjem fra Sudan ei uke i forveien. Der hadde jeg møtt mennesker som på ulike måter var rammet av den mest seiglivete borgerkrigen i Afrika. De hadde mistet familie, venner, kroppsdelar, helse, hjem eller arbeid. Gjennom drøyt tjue år er minst tre millioner døde som følge av krigen. Og nå finansieres krigen delvis av inntekter fra vestlige oljeselskaper, der også norske aksjefond har investert. Jeg glemmer ikke tre tenåringsjenter fra Yei i Sør-Sudan. De hadde flyktet fra Sudan da de var små. Jeg møtte dem i Uganda og spurte dem hva de husket fra hjembyen. «Bare likene langs veien ut av byen», var svaret. Mange av ofrene for krigen spurte hvorfor ikke folk i Vesten bryr seg om lidelsene deres, og hvordan vi i Vesten kan godta at krigen finansieres av vestlig oljeindustri. Jeg ble svar skyldig.

Den 11. september 2001 var jeg fremdeles ikke kommet mentalt hjem fra Sudan. Derfor ble det påtrengende klart for meg at hvite mennesker fremdeles regnes som langt mer verdifulle enn svarte, verden er dessverre ikke blitt en annen på dette punktet. Tre millioner døde i Sudan får brøkdelen av den oppmerksomheten tre tusen døde i New York får. Den samme beklemmende følelsen fikk jeg når de uskyldige ofrene for bombingene i Afghanistan ble omtalt i media. Jeg hadde slett ikke inntrykk at tapet av et uskyldig afghansk liv var like tragisk som tapet av et uskyldig amerikansk liv.

Men var ikke angrepet 11. september unikt som terrorhandling, og førte ikke denne terroren til at verden ble forandret? Angrepet må sammenlignes med en rekke andre islamistiske terrorangrep som vi har sett de siste årene. Jeg

tenker først og fremst på massakren på en buss med sveitsiske turister i Luxor i Egypt for noen år siden og på bomber som ble plassert ut på metrostasjoner i Paris. Fellestrekkene er klare for dem som har kjennskap til islamistisk motivert terror:

- Morderne i Luxor ønsket å destabilisere regimet i Egypt gjennom å skremme turistene bort.
- Attentatmennene i Paris ønsket å fjerne regimet i Algerie gjennom å gjøre den franske støtten til regimet så kostbar som mulig.
- Angrepet på World Trade Center skulle ramme den amerikanske støtten til regimet i Saudi-Arabia, som etter Osama bin Ladens mening har sviktet islam ved å gå i allianse med USA.

Den kjente journalisten Robert Fisk hadde et lengre intervju med Osama bin Laden i 1996, ikke lenge etter bombeangrepene mot amerikanske ambassader i Øst-Afrika. Men i samtalen var bin Laden nesten bare opptatt av å kritisere regimet i Saudi-Arabia, og nevnte knapt USA. Dette intervjuet var en av hans viktigste anledninger til å henvende seg til Vesten etter at han for alvor kom i søkelyset for terrorhandlinger. Innholdet bekrefter det vi visste om islamistisk tankegang fra før: Det er et hovedanliggende å rense islam ved å ta et oppgjør innad med dem som svikter de islamske idealene. Når en tyr til terror mot mål utenfor «islams hus», har denne terroreren ofte som sitt egentlige mål å svekke terroristenes motstandere i den muslimske verden gjennom å ramme deres allierte.

Men til og med på det kjente amerikanske TV-programmet *60 Minutes* like før ettårsmarkeringen etter 11. september kunne vi høre en amerikansk ekspert som mente at «de angrep oss fordi vi har lykket og de har mislyktes». Den aktuelle kommentatoren hadde altså ikke vunnet mer innsikt i USAs rolle i verden eller hvordan nasjonen tar seg ut med islamisters øyne. Heller ikke på denne måten er verden blitt annerledes. Tvert om ser det ut til at noen av de uheldigste stereotypiene som finnes i amerikansk opinion om resten av verden heller er blitt bekreftet og forsterket.

Mange har ment at terrorangrepet gjorde verden mer skremmende, vi må alle kunne vente å bli rammet av hensynsløs vold der vi befinner oss. Men for oss nordmenn er det større risiko for liv og helse knyttet til en biltur på E6 enn

til muligheten for et islamistisk terrorangrep. Og for amerikanere flest er det mange ganger så høy risiko for å bli drept i en skyteepisode med et av de millioner håndvåpen som finnes i det amerikanske samfunnet. Men disse uskyldige ofrene kan ikke regne med den samme omsorgen som ofre for islamistisk terror. Verden er fremdeles den samme.

Verden er forandret

Betyr dette at verden er uforandret av den 11. september? Selvsagt ikke. Det er ikke vanskelig å liste forandringer. Flysikkerheten ble tatt langt mer alvorlig enn før, det er langt mer omfattende kontroller og langt lavere toleransegrenser i luftfarten enn for ett års tid siden. Tidligere hadde en regnet med at eventuelle flykaprere ønsket å komme fra kapringen med livet, og at et kaprerdrama derfor ville utspille seg på bakken til sjuende og sist. Kapringene i fjor viste at en også må regne med kaprere som kalkulerer sine egne liv med inn i planene sine. Forslag om å sikre cockpiten er en direkte følge av denne erkjennelsen.

Umiddelbart etter den 11. september fryktet mange for at uskyldige muslimer kunne bli ofre for trakassering og vold som hevn for terroren i USA. I USA ble flere mennesker drept, også sikher og hinduer, og den amerikanske presidenten advarte mot slik vold og talte varmt om den positive rollen de fleste muslimer hadde i det amerikanske samfunnet. Sjelden har vi også sett at andre muslimer har tatt så sterk avstand fra handlinger begått i islams navn. Den interne muslimske debatten om dette og andre emner har kommet ut i det offentlige rommet i mye større grad det siste året. Dette har ført til at mange har fått et mer nyansert bilde av islam og muslimer.

Terrorangrepene har ført til en langt mer koordinert jakt på terrorister og deres medhjelpere. Saken er ikke ny, for eksempel førte også flystyrten over Lockerbie i Skottland til en omfattende og internasjonal etterforskning for å finne fram til de skyldige bak sprengningen av PanAm flight 103 på vei fra Tyskland til USA. Men nå er det et langt større alvor over jakten på de miljøene som planlegger og utfører terrorisme. Mest strategisk vil det være om en kan få avdekket kommunikasjonskanalene og finanskanalene som terroristen er helt avhengige av.

Men denne jakten har sin pris. Det er skremmende å se hvor lett mange politikere har vært villige til å ofre grunnleggende rettssikkerhetsprinsipper i denne sammenhengen. Vi har alt sett at folk kan bli fratatt sitt eksistensgrunnlag

bare på grunn av en mer eller mindre begrunnet mistanke. I Vesten har vi sett den type holdninger utvikle seg til både klappjakt på jøder og på kommunister. Den historien bør vi ha lært noe av.

Da den amerikanske presidenten kalte den nye krigen for et korstog, var vi mange som var bekymret for at dette skulle føre til forverrede forhold mellom muslimer og kristne verden over. Til en viss grad har det skjedd. Fra Indonesia, Pakistan og Nigeria har vi fått meldinger om vold mot kristne i kjølvannet av 11. september. I Vesten har mange muslimer opplevd trakassering og beskyldninger knyttet til terroren.

Realiteten er noe mer nyansert. Både i Indonesia, Pakistan og Nigeria hadde det lenge vært vold mot kristne, men etter 11. september ble den intensivert. Vi kan si at 11. september fungerte som en forsterker. Der hvor det var lokale konflikter fra før, ble forholdene vanskeligere og mer voldelige etterpå. På den annen side: der hvor muslimer og kristne hadde gode relasjoner til hverandre, har de ofte styrket disse relasjonene i ettertid. Muslimske venner har sagt til meg at dette viser hvor viktig det er at vi kjenner hverandre og har åpne kanaler til hverandre.

I et medieperspektiv ble det fort klart at 11. september splittet muslimene slik at den islamske verden ikke stod fram som en samlet blokk. To episoder satte seg fast hos meg. Den første var da Yassir Arafat la seg ned for å gi blod til ofrene for attentatet. Jeg vet ikke hvor dette blodet ble av, men som symbolhandling var dette meget viktig. Den andre var muslimene i World Islamic Mission som var samlet i moskeen i Åkebergveien til bønn for terrorofrene da en nordmann ringte moskeen og truet med å sprengte den.

Deler av debatten mellom muslimer har vært ført i det offentlige rommet og derfor gjort det langt klarere for folk flest at muslimer er forskjellige og at de har forskjellige oppfatninger om viktige spørsmål. Det er også andre store mediesaker som har medvirket til dette, som debattene om omskjæring, tvangsekteskap og æresdrap som har rast i landet vårt det siste året. Det er ikke lenger en «offisiell» representant som stiller på «muslimenes» vegne mot alle de andre, men muslimer sitter i en rekke ulike posisjoner i mange av de debattene som føres.

Gammelt og nytt

Terrorangrepene for ett år siden førte altså etter mitt skjønn ikke til at verden ble en annen, selv om mange ting ble annerledes. De grunnleggende strukturene i det internasjonale samfunn forblir det samme.

I en amerikansk kontekst ser dette annerledes ut. I USAs historie er dette en såpass enestående hendelse at den vil inngå på linje med det japanske angrepet på Pearl Harbor under andre verdenskrig.

Men i en global sammenheng og i et historisk perspektiv kommer disse terrorangrepene til å havne et stykke ned på listen over begivenheter som forandret verden, enten til det bedre eller til det verre.

Hva har vi lært? For meg er det to ting som står igjen etter 11. september 2001. Det handler om hvordan vi ser på menneskets verdi og hvordan vi ser på vold.

Terror av denne typen er bare mulig dersom jeg regner min motstander som verdiløs. Derfor vil en global opprustning av menneskeverdet være det viktigste bidraget til å forebygge terror. Men nettopp på dette punktet møter vi oss selv i døra; jeg har pekt på ovenfor hvordan vi på mange måter graderer menneskenes verdi slik at europeere og amerikanere er mer verd enn asiater eller afrikanere.

For det andre handler det om vold. Korstogene hadde sin teori om hellig vold, at volden var etisk sett nøytral og fikk sin etiske kvalitet fra formålet; «formålet helliger midlet». Religioner og livssyn utfordres nå til å arbeide etisk med alle de spørsmål som bruk av vold reiser, ikke minst sett i relasjon til menneskeverdet.

Den jobben har bare så vidt begynt.

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Munker og roma

Bilder fra Kosovo og Serbia

AV PER-ANDERS ROSENKVIST OG LEIF MAGNE HELGESEN (TEKST)



Den morgenen Maria Bobariu skal begravnes, kler hun seg naken inne i kirken. Mannen Mircca skal begravnes sammen med henne og legger sine klær sirlig på et teppe ute i gjørmen.

Det er søndag med frost og bleik sol over Tîrgu Mures. Kirkerommet fylles med sang fra hundre sigøynere. Evangelia! Evangelia! Evangelia!

Maria står barbeint og skjelvende på tregolv. Mircca fører en nervøs hånd gjennom det svarte håret.

- Før var det bare to kristne sigøynere i Romania, én amerikaner og meg, sier pastor Petru Radu. - Nå er det 126.000.

Sigøyerne er likevel ikke noe religiøst folk. Gjennom historien har de adoptert den til enhver tid gjeldende tro i et fåfengt forsøk på å unngå forfølgelser.

Sin lidenskap reserverer sigøynere flest for sin egen gruppe, ikke for noen ytre kraft. *Romipen* kalles den tette veven av symboler, regler og tabuer som har vernet sigøyerne mot utenverdenen.

Sigøyerne har selv ikke noe ord for sigøyer, men har overlevd i ulike klaner til tross for massive overgrep. Under annen verdenskrig ble rundt 500.000 sigøynere drept av nazistene.

Nå trues hele sigøyerkulturen av et moderne, snikende holocaust. Dette er kanskje en tid da sigøyerne trenger mer enn *Romipen* og egen styrke. Uten nasjonalstat og uten felles mål er sigøyerorganisasjonene for svake til å få politisk gjennomslag.

For Maria og Mircca Bobariu er det uansett en stor dag. De skal begrave sine gamle jeg. Fra landsbyene rundt Tîrgu Mures har menighetene sendt til sammen 14 sigøynere som skal voksendøpes.


- Hele livet, svarer en hvitkledd Mircca da sigøyerpastoren spør hvor lenge han vil være en kristen.

Mircca lar seg falle bakover, går under vannet i det vesle bassenget. Han begrades her, reises opp, dryppende våt, er født på ny.

Siden følger de andre hvitkledde. Maria smiler. Musikk og sang fyller kirken. Etter dåpen tegnes våte, kvinnelige fotavtrykk på tregolv. En bestemor med manglende fortenner og hvit håndveske går smilende ut i søndagen i nypussede Puma fotballsko.



















Tidlig om morgenen mens sola er i ferd med å løfte menneskene opp av sengen, svinger vi inn mot Decan klosteret vest i Kosovo. Vakkert fjellandskap omkranser klosterhagen. Sammen med et kresjendo av høstfarger i fjellsiden er det en stor naturopplevelse å nærme seg klosteret. Fjellene går opp i over 2000 meters høyde og grenser over til Montenegro og Albania. En kanon fra en tanks peker rett mot bilen vår. Italienske KFOR soldater står med fingeren på avtrekkeren der vi sakte kjører inn mot check-pointen. Vi har på forhånd lagt inn en adgangssøknad hos kommandanten så det hele går uproblematisk for seg. En eskorte leder oss frem til klostermurene. Rett utenfor murene står ti tanks oppstilt i påvente av hva som kan skje hvis volden igjen slipper løs. Kosovo er fremdeles et sted hvor noen mennesker lever i det som var, og gjør alt de kan for å holde på et fiendebildet som er i ferd med å forsvinne fra verdenskartet. Politisk vold, vold mot minoriteter og blodhevn er en del av bildet fra dagens Kosovo. Slik sett så er også de serbisk ortodokse klostrene i denne provinsen et mål for terrorhandlinger fra enkelte ekstremister som gjør alt de kan for å hindre en fredelig sameksistens mellom de forskjellige etniske grupper.

Selv vinden stopper opp et øyeblikk før den blåser sitt friske pust mellom klostermurene. Vannet sildrer ut fra en gammel fontene. Munkers bønn ligger som et fløyelsteppe over steinene som fører inn mot selve senteret i ethvert ortodoks kloster, nemlig kirken. Verden er utenfor. Det er jo også det som er meningen med hele klosterlivet. Alt som retter fokus mot verden, holdes utenfor murene. Fokus skal være bønnen og tradisjonene. Selv den høyrøstede blir hviskende i det han trer inn bak den høye muren. Stedet er mer enn en preken. Stedet er fred. Kontrastene er store til det yrende albanske folkeliv som foregår et steinkast utenfor klostermurene.

Klokken fire om morgenen hver dag året rundt vekkes de sovende munkene til en ny dag. En halvtime senere fylles kirkerommet med lesning og liturgiske sang. Morgenliturgien varer vanligvis mellom 3 og fire timer. Senere på dagen er det to

kortere messer. Livet i klosteret handler ikke bare om de ytre ting, men er en konstant tilværelse i bønn hvor den samme bønne repeteres etter mønster som fra århundrer tilbake. Målet er å gå over i en tilstand hvor bønne er blitt en del av dagens pust. Også når munken maler ikoner, jobber på kjøkkenet, er ute på jordet eller til og med når han sover, skal bønneverset følge med sammen med munkens åndedrett. Det tar tid å utvikle denne form for åndelig liv, men som ikonmaleren Arsenie sa til oss; «Når vi gir vårt munkeløfte så lover vi å be 'Jesus bønne' hva vi enn gjør. Det er ikke alltid like lett. Vi prøver, men svikter ofte og må jobbe oss tilbake».

Vi er blitt invitert inn i klosterets malerstue hvor ikonmalerne møysommelig og nøyaktig arbeider slik tradisjonene har lært dem. Det er ikke spor av nymoderne kirkekunst og tolkninger. Den bysantinske tradisjon skal følges til minste detalj. Med riktig belysning fra lange takvinduer rettet mot nord, sitter tre munkere å maler ikoner. Ventetiden for å få kjøpt et ikon er for tiden over ett år, så en av klosterets inntektskilder er sikret en tid fremover. Fader Arsenie serverer oss en kopp med spesialkaffe bestående av en blanding av kaffe, kakao og honning. Honning er kanskje den viktigste næringskilden til munkene siden de følger strenge faste rutiner gjennom året. Som seg hør og bør blir vi også tilbudt klosterets egenproduserte brennevin, eller Raki som den kalles. Sammen med lyden av liturgisk sang gjennom høytalerne og synet av vakre høstkledd fjell i bakgrunnen vandrer samtalen rundt bønn, krig og fremtid.

En uke etterpå er vi tilbake i klosteret. Vi er invitert til klosterets store festdag til ære for St.Stefan som er klosterets helgen. Tilstede ved messen er også biskop Artemije sammen med Fader Sava. Biskop Artemije er blitt et symbol for mange serbere gjennom sin aktive motstand av volden i Kosovo siden våren 1998, samt sin motstand mot Milosevic regime. Fader Sava er blitt den kjente talsmann for den ortodokse kirke gjennom sine beskrivelser og politiske uttalelser via internett under og etter krigen. Fader Sava forteller at rundt 200 albanere og sigøynere søkte tilflukt i klosteret under krigsperioden. En albansk kvinne vi snakker med i landsbyen utenfor forteller at Fader Sava selv vandret rundt sammen med noen av munkene og prøvde å hjelpe dem som led mest gjennom denne perioden. Vår albanske venninne uttaler at hun gjerne kunne tenke seg å besøke klosteret. Kanskje ligger det et håp et eller annet sted om forsoning og fred.

Presten begynner å tenne røkelsen. Som bønner til Gud stiger røyken mot himmelen og fyller samtidig rommet med velduftende aroma av tørkede blomster. Tak og vegger er fullstendig dekket av ikonmalerier fra tidligere århundrer. Decan klosteret ble etablert på 1300 tallet. På selve klosterets fest dag i år 2000, 24 novem-

ber, avlegger fire noviser sitt munkeløfte og blir dermed fullverdige munk. De forlater sine familie navn og blir for fremtiden hetende Fader Jeremia, Fader Esekiel, Fader Daniel og Fader Isahia. Egentlig burde det vært en selvmotsigelse at antallet munk øker under slike forhold. Klosteret ble sommeren 2000 beskyttet av granater. De matvarer som klostret trenger bringes inn fra nabostaten Montenegro på nattetid godt beskyttet av en KFOR eskorte. Faren for snikskyttere fra åsene rundt klostret er hele tiden tilstede. Fader Arsenie sier det slik; «For det spirituelle liv i klostret er dette en god tid. For noe av det som en munk må fokusere på er døden. Vi må aldri glemme at vi skal dø, og gå over til en annen sfære. Vi er ikke redde for døden, vi er redde for synden, og for å dø uten å være klar».











En kollega var forleden ute for å handle noen varer på den norske KFOR butikken utenfor Pristina. Da betjeningen fikk greie på at han representerte Kirkens Nødhjelp og at vi jobber med sigøynere, ble han vist ut på lageret hvor det stod flere esker med Sørlandschips og norsk sjokolade som var gått ut på dato. Siden varene fortsatt er like gode, kunne han ta med seg det han ville. Bilen ble fylt opp av godsaker, og kursen satt mot flyktningleirene på nordsiden av Mitrovica. Vi fikk en følelsen av å være julenisse da sjokoladen og sørlandschipsen ble delt ut med lik porsjon til alle barna. Barneansiktene ble forvandlet til et stort smil da sjokoladen rant nedover munnen. Etter at barna fylte sine mager med sjokolade og chips, koste de seg oppe i de tomme eskene. For anledningen gav vi de kallenavnet; «Sørlandsgipsy.» De små ting kan forandre selv en grå augstdag til en følelse av julaften.

I samarbeid med UNMIK (United Mission in Kosovo) planlegger Kirkens Nødhjelp nå å returnere 19 familier fra flyktningleiren Plementina til Oblic noen steinkast unna. Leiren består av ulike grupper av sigøynere. Også en serberfamilie vil returnere, samt at tre albanske hus skal reises. I alt er planen å bygge 23 hus i løpet av de neste månedene. Vi har fått i oppdrag å sørge for vann, sanitær og elektrisitet til husene. Norsk UD har sagt ja til å støtte prosjektet, som vil bli et pilotprosjekt når det gjelder retur i dette området. Sigøynere fra Plementina leiren er hovedaklig såkalte Askalias, det vil si albansktalende muslimer. Likevel er prosjektet vanskelig, og det vil utfordre både oss, de lokale myndigheter og kommende naboer. Retur vil være hovedprioritet i det humanitære arbeidet i Kosovo i de kommende årene, og en prøve på det kosovoalbanske samfunnet. Med den manglende bevegelsesfrihet som minoriteter lever under i dag, har Kosovo paralleller til et apartheid-

samfunn hvor mennesker blir diskriminert og forfulgt på grunn av etnisitet, språk og religion. Det er en uverdigg og uholdbar situasjon.

Flyktningleiren Plementina ligger vis a vis en av de norske KFOR leirene utenfor Pristina. Mange av flyktingene kommer fra selve Pristina som ligger noen få kilometer unna. Rundt 500 sigøynere bor i denne leiren. Kirkens Nødhjelp driver tre sigøyrerleirer på nordsiden av Mitrovica. Mens sigøynere nord for Mitrovica har frihet til å bevege seg i det serbiske området, har beboerne i Plementina ingen bevegelsesfrihet. De er dømt til å være innenfor leirområdet. Det hele minner mer om en konsentrasjonsleir hvor norsk KFOR står for vaktholdet. Forskjellen fra en konsentrasjonsleir er at det militære vaktholdet ikke fungerer som et vakthold for fanger, men er en sikkerhet mot overgrep utenfra. Når vi nå planlegger en retur foregår det i nært samarbeid med lokale albanske myndigheter, de albanske naboene, FN og norsk KFOR. Håpet er at situasjonen har roet seg slik at returen vil gå fredelig for seg.

Det er en skjebnens ironi at Norge og andre vestlige land bombet Serbia og Kosovo for tre år siden for å beskytte kosovoalbanerne, mens de i ettertid har hatt en internasjonal militær styrke i Kosovo med hovedfokus på å beskytte serberne mot kosovoalbanerne. Mange av de hevnaaksjoner som har funnet sted i etterkant av krigen i 99 viser at kosovoalbanerne ikke ligger tilbake for serberne med hensyn til forfølgelse, trakassjoner og vold mot den andre part. Som en kosovoalbanske sa til meg for et par år siden; «Vi er blitt akkurat slik som vi beskyldte serberne for å være». Mye har skjedd siden denne uttalelsen fant sted. Den åpne volden og hevneaksjonene har minnet. KFOR er i ferd med å redusere sine tropper. Det synlige militære nærværet er i ferd med å reduseres ved å fjerne flere kontrollposter og minske bruken av 'tunge' militære kjøretøy. Det vitner om en militær strategi som handler om å normalisere det visuelle bildet. Dog kan en bli lurt til å tro at faren er over og at minoriteter kan leve fritt i Kosovo. Det ligger nok enda et stykke fram i tid før minoriteter som serbere og sigøynere kan bevege seg fritt i Kosovo uten fare for sitt eget liv.

Antagelser tilsier at mellom 70 - 80 % av serberne ønsker å returnere til Kosovo. Spesielt de som kommer fra landsbyer og mindre steder i Kosovo har et ønske om å reise hjem. De resterende ser ingen fremtid eller håp i å returnere, og belager seg på å bli på sine nye hjemsteder. Mange hus er enten brent eller okkupert, og noen har også solgt sine hus til kosovoalbanske oppkjøpere. I dag er det 4 - 500.000 flyktinger fra Kroatia og Bosnia i Jugoslavia (Serbia og Montenegro). I tillegg kommer vel 200.000 som er fordrevet fra Kosovo. Bak tallene skjuler det seg mange skjebner, stor fattigdom og arbeidsledighet.

Sammen med de konkrete oppgavene som følger et returprogram må vi også jobbe parallelt med tillitsbyggende arbeid for å øke tiliten mellom folkeslagene. Sørlandschips gir en farge i en grå og hard hverdag, men den store utfordringen ligger i å flytte disse familiene tilbake til deres tidligere bosted og sikre fredelige og gode levevilkår. Derfor arbeider vi

for at flyktningeleirene skal være midlertidige og ikke permanente bosetninger. Situasjonen i dag tilsier at retur av flyktingene vil bli en vanskelig og tidkrevende prosess, men vi håper og vil arbeide for at menneskerettighetene også skal få sin plass i et fremtidig Kosovo.

Bildene er tilhører en utstilling i regi av Kirkens Nødhjelp. Bildene (og den første teksten) er av Per-Anders Rosenkvist. Normannsgate 43, 0655 Oslo. Tlf 22194095/95112356. E-post: perand@online.no. Leif Magne Helgesen er Kirkens Nødhjelps representant på Balkan. Tlf: +381 63 313134 eller 91713134. E-mail: lmhelgesen@hotmail.com. WEB: www.nca.no.

Den kristne kirkes historie og konfesjonelle inndeling

AV JAN RANTRUD

Figuren på neste side er en sterkt forenklet framstilling av den kristne kirkes historie og konfesjonelle inndeling fra dens begynnelse til i dag. Det skal illustrere følgende hovedpunkter:

1) Kulturelt-geografisk er kirken fra begynnelsen av tre-delt. En semittisk del som har brukt hebraisk og det nært beslektete språk arameisk (syrisk) som li-


turgisk språk og klassisk lærespråk. En gresktalende del som vi også kan kalle bysantinsk, og en latinsk del som utgjør den romersk-katolske og de protestantiske kirkesamfunn. Generelt sett finnes de i en øst- vest akse. Disse tre hoveddelene har på tross av mange underinndelinger – eksempelvis vil jeg regne den russisk-ortodokse kirke inn under den greske hoveddelen – klare fellestrekk i læretradisjoner, liturgi, fromhetsformer og kulturytringer som definerer dem i forhold til hverandre. Interessant nok har den historiske utviklingen her fulgt linjer som antydes ved de tre språk som Pilatus' proklamasjon av Jesus som Messias i inskripsjonen over hans hode på korset.

2) Historisk-konfesjonelt har kirken delt seg i fem familier, på figuren ved de vertikale linjene som ender i piler på toppen. De horisontale linjene representerer utskillinger av nye kirkesamfunn fra gamle. De fem kirkefamilene kan kalles Øst-syrisk («Nestoriansk»), Vest-syrisk («Monofysittisk»), Ortodoks, Katolsk og Protestantisk. Disse betegnelsene er egentlig til dels sterkt misvisende, men fordi de er ganske utbredt er de valgt i mangel av noe bedre.

En liten kirkehistorisk klatretur i treet.

Den kristne kirkes røtter står i jødisk og israelsk jord fra begynnelsen av. Bare jøder og proselytter var til stede ved oppstandelsen og åndsutgytelsen på første pinsedag. I løpet av det første århundret, spesielt etter Jerusalems fall år 70 vil dens spredning ha gitt nye tyngdepunkter; Antiokia, Alexandria (ikke vist), Edessa, Roma og senere Konstantinopel. Det går an å si at kirken var grunnleggende sett en fram til år 431. Den samlede kirke hadde definert sitt trosgrunnlag og avvist konkurrerende kirkedannelser og læresystemer som kjetterske, mest tydelig gjennom Nikea-konsilet år 325.

Kirkekart



– Efesus-konsilet år 431 er den første virkelige oppdeling av kirken. To retninger, som begge godtar Nikea-konsilets formuleringer deler seg formelt på uenighet over visse kompliserte kristologiske oppfatninger – mer reelt ut fra kulturelle, politiske og til dels personlige motsetninger. Den ene blir senere kalt «Nestoriansk», men kalles her Øst-syrisk. Den kan også kalles assyrisk. Fra sitt

opprinnelige kjerneområde i Mesopotamia og litt senere også i Iran og Kaukasus sprer den seg raskt østover til India og etter hvert langs karavaneveiene over sentral-Asia til Kina og Mongolia. Via denne kirken når Evangeliet Stillehavet før det når Nordsjøen! Middelalderens politiske katastrofer og folkevandringer utrydder mesteparten av den Øst-syriske kirke, men ganske store rester finnes den dag i dag. I Sverige er det i dag et eget bispedømme for flere tusen flyktninger fra Midtøsten tilhørende denne kirken. Dens offisielle navn blir på norsk Den Hellige Katolske Apostolske Assyriske Kirke i Østen. Den Øst-syriske kirke regner sin apostolske suksesjon fra apostelen Peter i Babylon, (1.Pet 5:13) der han overdro apostelmyndigheten til sin etterfølger.

– Den andre hovedretningen i kirken deler seg igjen 20 år senere, ved Kalkedon-konsilet år 451. Også her gjelder det formelt uenighet om kristologiske formuleringer, og den østlige grenen kalles (unøyaktig) for «Monofysittisk». Den består etter hvert av nasjonalkirker utenfor det gamle romerriket. En vest-syrisk kirke som også kalles Syrisk-ortodoks og Jakobittisk og som regner sin suksesjon fra Jesu broder Jakob som ledet Jerusalem-menigheten. Den indiske opprinnelige Tomas-kirken, Den armenske kirke, Den koptiske kirke og Den etiopiske kirke hører også til denne konfesjonsfamilien.

– Den største og mest sentrale del av kirken samlet seg etter hvert rundt de fem i prinsippet likeverdige patriarkatene Jerusalem, Aleksandria, Roma, Antiochia og Konstantinopel. Tross mangfoldet ble formell enhet beholdt inntil et (eller rettere sagt ett av flere) endelig brudd skjedde over den såkalte «filioque» formuleringen av den nikensk-konstantinopolitanske trosbekjennelse i 1054, da patriarken (paven) av Roma ble formelt ekskludert fra kirkens felleskap av de andre. For oss er dette interessant i og med at det skjedde etter at kristendommen var både reelt og formelt fast etablert i Norge.

Etter 1054 kan man altså snakke om en ortodoks og en katolsk gren av kirken. Til den ortodokse hører de greske, russiske og øst-europeiske nasjonale kirkesamfunn. De fleste av dem, men ikke den russiske, anerkjenner den økumeniske patriark i Konstantinopel som samlende fellesinstitusjon. Den serbisk-ortodokse kirke tilhører denne konfesjonsfamilien.

Reformasjonen på 1500-tallet er en lokal splittelse innenfor og vekk fra den romersk-katolske kirke. Den har aldri angått og har ikke hatt noen betydning for de tre andre kirkefamilier.

Totalbildet er selvfølgelig langt mer komplisert enn slik det er antydnet i den korte skissen ovenfor. Eksempelvis er den romersk-katolske kirke bare en av de mange kirker som er samlet i anerkjennelsen av paven i Roma som samlende overhode. Man har syrisk-katolske, gresk-katolske, koptisk-katolske og andre nasjonale grener, samt to selvstendige patriarkater i Midt-østen som er tilknyttet samme familie; Den maronittiske kirke og Den melkittiske kirke. Tallmessig sett er den romersk-katolske kirke langt den største av dem alle.

Fra 90-årene av har det skjedd historiske tilnærmelser mellom de gamle kirkefamilie, hvor mer enn 1500 år gamle bruddlinjer gradvis blir overbygget og helet. Det gjelder både mellom den Øst-syriske og Romersk-katolske kirke, og mellom de «Monofysittiske» og Ortodokse kirker.

Internett er etter hvert et utmerket redskap til å skaffe seg nærmere kjennskap til kirkesamfunn vi før har regnet som eksotiske. Søkord som «Assyrian Church», «Syrian Orthodox Church», «Coptic Church» og så videre vil lede til informative hjemmesider og andre opplysninger.

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The Value of Political Realism

BY COMMANDER HANS OLAV STENSLI

Introduction

The debate on political realism, a set of ontological assumptions about international politics, has been a central theme in international relations over the past 40 years. Many scholars and politicians have wrestled over the question of the limitations and insights of realism. Still, realism seems very much alive today, one reason perhaps being that the value of realism as an analytical tool seems to become more relevant to policymakers in times of crises. In turn, such changes cause further debate among realists and their critics.

In *PACEM* 5:2 (2002), Commander Raag Rolfsen¹⁷ in practise argues that we are in need of a new framework for analysing international politics. According to Rolfsen,

A situation characterized by globalisation, democratisation and a new sense of shared vulnerability demands a novel theoretical framework for world politics.

Rolfsen's aim is indeed ambitious, but his state of departure is surprising: political realism cannot provide this framework because, again according to Rolfsen, it was developed in an *undemocratic environment*.¹⁸ Thus, we are not far from concluding that realism is corrupted and that realists are conspicuous people.¹⁹ This bold proclamation illuminates the front between idealism and

¹⁷ Rolfsen, 2002: 115

¹⁸ Ibid: 115

¹⁹ Numerous scholars have reduced the meaning of realism to a level of banality. The worst among the more famous efforts to do so can be found in Walzer's (1977) chapter 1 of *Just and Unjust Wars*. In this book Walzer actually mistakes the conduct in war of the generals of Athens for political realism as such. Unfortu-

realism in a manner that is not typical of Norwegian academic discourses on international relations. Rolfsen has delivered a substantial and refreshing article. It is of such originality and importance that it deserves to be debated and criticised, which is no evident feature in contributions on world politics in Norway. Having said that, my motivation to engage in such a debate does not spring from a wholehearted embracement of realism. Rather, its source is the belief that a theory of foreign policy cannot do without significant elements of realism. Traditional security policy can never remove our vulnerability. At this point there simply is no disagreement between “realists” and “idealists”. However, security has an instrumental value in ensuring other ends. Thus, acknowledging our vulnerability does not remove the value and importance of security as phenomenon and concept.²⁰

In this article, I will discuss whether the effort to construct a new security concept possibly can succeed when it simultaneously becomes an attack on political realism (PR). Rolfsen undoubtedly deals some blows against Hans Morgenthau’s Theory of International Politics, although the same points have been made by others before him.²¹ Indeed, political realism has to be anchored to ideals and visions of desired end states beyond its basic assumptions,²² but my main line of argument is that any attempt at establishing a basis for ethical conduct in politics is bound to remain a purely theoretical construction without empirical relevance if it is not mixed with a sound and thorough understanding

nately, some realists are responsible for this confusion, since they have included Thucydides as part of the school of thought that we have named political realism. I believe this unfeasible view also has been represented in earlier versions of *PACEM*.

²⁰ Buzan, 1991, is an interesting example of a “softer”, yet unmistakably, structural realism acknowledging this.

²¹ It is often the case that pioneering works are easy to criticise. This was especially true of Morgenthau, who in 1948 tried to challenge American idealism. In this way, his *Politics Among Nations* got a programmatic character. Thus, Americans criticised Morgenthau for his “Germanic” way of thinking.

²² E.h: Carr stressed this point in an elegant manner in 1939. As a realist, he clearly saw that realism must be connected to visions and goals with stronger normative appeals. I believe it is rather obvious that all political realists in the Western world writing after Holocaust in fact were motivated by the desire to avoid future tragedies on the horrendous scale witnessed during WW II. Thus, the aim of Morgenthau, Kissinger, Waltz and others was not to found a Normative Justification for Democracy (witness the contrast with post WW II-German social theory), but to contribute to a theory of how to secure the *precondition* of democracy and human rights. Thus, the main concern of political realists is the survival of sovereign states and basic principles to remain stability in the relations among sovereign states. Not, I will hold, as an ultimate goal for human rationality, but in order to secure democracy and decency in world politics. The avoidance of war is the basis for upholding democracy and human rights at all.

of PR. The reason simply is, that since *the existence* of a polity is a precondition for thinking about, implementing and evaluating policies in other areas, politics based on realism is required in the first place in order to secure the polity. There can be no democracy without a modern state, and no state without a minimum level of security through a monopoly of violence. Herein lies a significant aspect of what makes the state legitimate to its citizens. In this way, one can even claim that all normative evaluations and – theories implicitly rest on *minimum* requirements both to the practises and theoretical considerations of realism.²³ Indeed, one should at least question whether attempts at denying the empirical relevance of PR could lead us into paralysis or hypocrisy. The latter can even serve, unintentionally to be sure, as a basis for demonising opponents, thus functioning as a (moral) sentiment that forms the basis of a more hawkish or brutal conduct in international crisis than is necessary. The prudence found in Morgenthau should not be seen as cynical or a-ethical, but rather as a configuration of thought that should balance our aspirations to fulfil what Morgenthau calls the ultimate aims of politics. The central political problem is exactly how to translate these aspirations (like democracy and human rights) into feasible and efficient decisions. But in order to pursue these important goals, the ability to use power, be it hard or soft, is required.

In his bold attempt at constructing an alternative to political realism, Rolfsen in fact lends himself to a description of certain current developments²⁴ that is built on elements of realism, while his proposals (a new understanding of security) is based on strong appeals to idealism in the sense that he sees his own suggestions as a real alternative to PR. Concerning the latter point, Rolfsen could have found a richer tradition of thought in PR if he had also looked elsewhere than in Morgenthau. The core of realism is prudence, not aggression, unilateralism or imperialism.²⁵

In my opinion, the gap between idealism and realism is such in Rolfsen's contribution that it deserves an answer concerning his conception of political realism. Having said this, I believe Rolfsen's attempt should be applauded for

²³ Thinking, in the abstract, about security and vulnerability is possible without a polity. But to carry out or evaluate governmental policies along the security dimension requires a state.

²⁴ I believe Rolfsen and I are not commencing from incommensurable scientific standpoints, since Rolfsen's article indicates that he believes it possible to analyse social reality. The last lines on page 115 shows that he is able to characterise the present global state of affairs in a rather straightforward manner.

²⁵ See especially Kissinger, 1957, and Wæver, 1992.

its frankness and its refreshing normative statements. My main concern here is not to criticise a particular author, but rather to illuminate the weaknesses I have come to see as inherent in all contributions to normative theory in which political realism is too easily condemned, grossly simplified, ridiculed or simply ignored.

Rolfsen on Realism

The first aspect in Rolfsen's article that strikes me as odd is his very selective reading of political realism. As Wæver²⁶ shows, there is no such thing as a *single* "political realism" that can be treated as a Theory. Rather,

Political realism should be seen as a group or class of theories, hypothesis and world views that have no more in common than a pessimistic view towards utopian notions of progress solely based on appeals to reason and values.

Unfortunately, realists tell us, our first task is to secure relative peace (absence of war) and stability. Realists thus are sceptical against any thinker or politician who claims to have found a promising path towards a platform on which to build a universal approach to secure democracy, toleration, the rule of law, human rights and peace, all being the ultimate goals of both idealists and realists. But building peace is actually far more difficult than wishing it. This latter truism is a classical inspiration of political realism, since it leads the scholar into considering an ethics of responsibility and expected consequences rather than elaborate attempts at analysing universally applicable ethical norms. As mentioned, the central normative appeal in realism itself is that the survival of the polity is the *precondition* for thinking about foreign policy (including ethics) at all.

I believe that any serious discussion of ethics in politics, and policies of security, should acknowledge this heritage of PR as a *starting point* of the discussion. I believe most realists would pose the following question; how can it be immoral to lay emphasis on the survival of one's own polity? Realists will claim that, in principle, there is nothing wrong *a priori*, in striving to meet the most basic of all national interests; namely survival.

Rolfsen, in my view, has based his criticism of realism on three fragile assumptions. Firstly, he asserts that realism "takes as its basic assumption that

²⁶ Wæver, 1992: chapter 3.

power is, or ought to be, the primary end of political action.”²⁷ Secondly; “The theory has a long history.”²⁸ Thirdly, according to Rolfsen, the writings (here defined as one single publication) by Hans J. Morgenthau can be seen as representing Political realism. I believe Rolfsen misses some highly substantial nuances on all three points, and that his treatment of especially the first and third assumptions produces an analysis of realism that gives us fewer insights than could have been possible by a richer reading of realism. Concerning *assumption one*; to say, as Morgenthau, that all politics is about power, and is a struggle for power, is not to claim that power itself is the ultimate aim of politics. Rather, power is a desired goal in the first instance, since once required; it is a means to reach ultimate, substantial human values. The way Rolfsen treats his assumptions on realism, they all point in the same direction; towards the abandonment of realism and the adoption of the “need for a New Understanding of Security.” We may be right in emphasising the need for a broader and richer concept of security than that envisaged by Morgenthau, but this concept must embrace security in the traditional sense while simultaneously including a broader set of questions and priorities. Thus, realism cannot be easily dismissed out of hand. Regarding *assumption two*, the portrait of realism as an old school of thought also seems to serve a special purpose. Who can resist such a conclusion when, in Rolfsen’s words, realism;

*in Morgenthau’s version, is thus conservative, undemocratic and irrational.*²⁹

I am simply surprised by the strategy chosen by Rolfsen at this point. By portraying PR as undemocratic, he has simply tried to close the debate concerning the theoretical underpinnings of the security concept. Rolfsen has also, in my view implicitly, dismissed the policy of national survival as a precondition for thinking about security in the modern state. If this is not Rolfsen’s view (and I doubt that it really is), he must clarify his arguments, since his attack on PR and defence of the vulnerability-concept to a significant degree points in the direction of pacifism. I do not believe that it is possible to harmonise the “ethics of vulnerability” as proposed by Rolfsen, with the model for thinking about security as proposed in *Forsvarets Fellesoperative doktrine, del A*.³⁰ Thus, it would

²⁷ Rolfsen, 2002: 118.

²⁸ Rolfsen, 2002: 118.

²⁹ Rolfsen, 2002: 121.

³⁰ FFOD, del A: 81.

be highly interesting to know what implications the “ethics of vulnerability”, if taken seriously, could have for the future of the Norwegian Armed Forces.

Rolfesen sees the “undemocratic” element of realism as a result of the historical context in which PR was forged. At this point, he is simply wrong. *Political realism as a school of thought was only developed from 1939 till 1957 by scholars in the US and the UK!*³¹

The possible argument³² that PR would be unfit for present analysis, *if* it had been crafted in an “undemocratic context” would be no more sensible than the claim that the philosophy of Immanuel Kant must be flawed because Kant lived in 18th century Prussia!

Political realism is certainly not incompatible with democracy, toleration, and the defence of human rights. But PR *is not a theory about these phenomena as such!* Rather, PR is a school of thought overwhelmingly preoccupied by how to protect these values. Morgenthau has never claimed to present a *Theory of Ethics*, simply because politics always is about the tension between ethics (including “ultimate aims”, in the words of Morgenthau) and feasible actions and outcomes (immediate aims). When political realism was constructed in the Western World in the 20th Century, it was implicitly in defence against appeasement as well as against what Kissinger called revolutionary powers. By revolutionary powers, Kissinger meant the powers that seek destruction of others in order to secure themselves. To avoid the destruction of its own policy clearly must be given priority in times of crises. Furthermore, there has never existed a modern democracy without a functioning state. And in modern history, the rule of law and respect for basic human rights has hardly existed outside of democracies. It is for these reasons political scientists have been so occupied with the study of the relations between states, state institutions and democratisation.³³

³¹ See Wæver, 1992: chapter 3 for this view. I believe the formation of realism began in earnest with E. H. Carr’s *The Twenty years Crisis* (1939), and was consolidated with Kissinger’s *A World Restored* (1957).

³² Assuming that PR is indeed an “old school” of thought, like both some realists and their opponents believe.

³³ There are many other subjects that are studied as well. The question of ethics in politics seems to be a growing field of study. Perhaps a fruitful cooperation between theologians, philosophers and social scientists could develop out of this common concern?

To return to the slightly more arcane ground of theories; When discussing PR, the critic should lay more emphasis on the recent development of the theory, since its present outlook is NOT a result of laying one brick on top of another in a cumulative construction of knowledge. At this point, we have reached Rolfsen's *third assumption* of realism. Most political realists today (see for example Waltz, 1979 and Wendt, 1999) explain the existence of an international anarchy³⁴ not through generalisations on human nature, but through the structures of international politics themselves. The point is that the present power politics between large powers exists and will remain to exist independently of our conception of human nature. By and large, there is nothing "new" in this mode of thinking. As a matter of fact, Thomas Hobbes (1651) stressed that while a state of nature actually never existed among rational human beings, a state of nature did indeed exist amongst sovereigns, since one *central* supranational *authority* has never existed. But the point is that Hobbes never claimed that this state of affairs was a result of the human nature, but rather a *result of the nature of international politics* itself. There will never be no International authority with credible legislative or executive branches that states will be responsible to.³⁵ Herein, in short, lay the roots of the turbulent character of international relations. But at the same time, this structural realism does not lend itself to metaphysical generalisations on human nature. Like the ethics of vulnerability proposed by Rolfsen, this is also an argument in favour of acknowledging the limits of our aspirations to make our own values universal.

The first flaw in realism, according to Rolfsen, is its self-representation as "a-ethical", while simultaneously claiming normative appeal. I believe Rolfsen is right in criticising any political realist that makes such claims. However, I am not able to find any such realist theorist since modern political realism was born in the middle of the 20th Century. Even a hardcore realist as Morgenthau (1993: 12) states,

Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action.

Morgenthau is not a-ethical. His ethics is simply an ethics of expected consequences. In this respect, he is not so different from the founder of empirical

³⁴ The concept of anarchy is also a debatable metaphor that is an obvious aim for criticism. The meaning of anarchy is only logical when contrasted with the opposite-hierarchy. Thus, a centralised institution of authority responsible for decision-making represents hierarchy. Anarchy, on the other hand, characterises a decentralised mode of responsibility and decision-making procedures.

³⁵ To make such a statement is NOT an argument in defence of such a state of affairs.

sociology, Max Weber. Having said this, I agree with Rolfsen that Morgenthau is not very sophisticated on the distinction between the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of his theory. Morgenthau is actually quite honest; he does not purport to present a theory of ethics. I believe it unfair to PR, however, to exclusively explain PR on the basis of Morgenthau's writings. Why has Rolfsen not quoted E.H. Carr? Why is structural realism totally ignored? Perhaps the ethical implications of these theories are harder to address? The alternative to this kind of ethics in politics is not necessarily attractive. This does not exclude the possibility that genuinely altruistic behaviour might occur in international relations, whenever this is possible under the given circumstances. But most importantly, there might be good reasons for following the implicit ethics of PR – the ethics of consequences, judged by pragmatically interpreted moral criteria. Perhaps it was this line of reasoning that led Morgenthau to criticise the US decision to wage war in Vietnam in the first place?

Let us go a bit further in evaluating the practical consequences of political realism versus idealism in discourses on armed intervention. When considering this question, one could perhaps continue by reflecting over the war between NATO and FRY in 1999. To many a political realist, including officers and old "hawks" as Henry Kissinger, the justification, the diplomacy leading up to, as well as the conduct of, the war on behalf of NATO seemed dubious. The idealistic "humanists" on the other hand, more or less portrayed the conflict as a classical drama between Good and Evil, in which other means than military force was seen as insufficient in order to reach a peaceful solution.³⁶ At the time of writing, there is much debate worldwide, *including* in the US polity (Rolfsen is silent on the latter debate), whether and how the USA should invade Iraq. Again, political realists seem to be much more reluctant to such unilateral US actions. These critics include Lawrence Eagleburger, Norman Schwartzkopf, A. Zenni, B. Scowcroft, Wesley Clark, Samuel Huntington and again, Henry Kissinger. The debates on Vietnam, Kosovo and Iraq show that political realism might perhaps be a more sophisticated ethical platform than Rolfsen thinks. In line with Jon Hellesnes³⁷, the reason is perhaps that political realism is less ideologically laden than any other alternative. Consistent political realists do

³⁶ Without mentioning names, I must confess that I was rather surprised by the intense defence of the air campaign by members of SV and humanitarian organisations (Norwegian NGOs) prior to the war in 1999. These defenders of intervention undoubtedly had the best of intentions. The problem was perhaps not whether or not we should intervene, but *how* this actually should be done.

³⁷ Morgenbladet, 24 mai 2002.

not demonise the “Other”. Thus, one is forced to balance the possible with the desirable, to recognise one’s opponent or allied as a bearer of a distinct identity. The point made by Hellesnes actually is that there can be good reasons to follow what he calls the *methodological* a-moralism³⁸ of political realism, since the ultimate aim of realism is to decrease levels of destruction and the use of violence.

His assumption that unilateral “hegemony” is incompatible with political realism is not a particularly strong case against realism. For further readings, one can only recommend reading Robert Gilpin³⁹ and Immanuel Wallerstein.⁴⁰ The basic point about the balance of power is NOT that there always exists such a balance, but that international politics always is in a flux to and from such equilibria. To be short; “hegemony” is not incompatible with realism. According to Rolfsen, the USA is a hegemonous power, while realism still thrives! *The substantial question* at this stage is what Rolfsen, and other scholars applying the term, actually mean by a “hegemon”. As political realists will be quick to point out, the phrase can be utterly misleading. The reason simply is that the concept leaves the impression of one single, unrestrained hegemonious power with the abilities to achieve what it wants, where it wants. This is hardly an accurate or rich description of reality; witness the economic balance of power between the EU and the USA, and the relatively weak influence of the United States on Chinese foreign and domestic politics. The use of the term hegemony thus distorts the perception of world politics by ignoring the second and the third worlds.

Moreover, when Rolfsen⁴¹ claims that PR goes beyond logical positivism, he is off the mark; both Kissinger and Morgenthau are highly modest on one point; what it is possible and impossible to deduce from general theorems about poli-

³⁸ I believe this is a rather odd word. Further, I think Hellesnes is wrong in claiming that realism is a-moralistic. On the contrary, the ethics of responsibility, that Hellesnes seems to defend, is implicit in PR.

³⁹ Gilpin, 1987.

⁴⁰ Wallerstein, 1974, 1980, 1989. Wallerstein shares a materialistic view of history with realist theorists. One should also note the close epistemological similarity between Wallerstein and Waltz, 1979. Both scholars ascribe the logic of the international system to its decentralised and unpersonal systemic structures. One should not, as Einar Steensnæs (address delivered on September 14th 1999, conference on Military ethics in Oslo Militære Samfund, arranged by Feltprestkorpsset), be surprised that realists (like many officers) sometimes share the view of left-wing radicals when it comes to humanitarian interventions. The reason is their common scepticism towards idealistic goals in foreign policy, and especially the feasibility of producing Democracy, a thriving market economy and human rights in areas of unrest through the use of bombs and grenades.

⁴¹ Rolfsen, 2002: 120.

tics. At the same time, this leaves the political realist with a limited number of rules that are believed to be generally applicable. The very reasons for these, at first sight, simple theories are the very empirical complexities of the phenomena to be studied. One cannot gain more than a framework for asking the right questions and looking at the right places when studying foreign policy.⁴²

The rest is to be left to astrologists and soothsayers. Thus, Morgenthau once criticised the *foreign policy* of J.F. Kennedy in the following way:

*The statesman must cross the Rubicon not knowing how deep and turbulent the river is, or what he will find on the other side (...) Rather than seeking unattainable knowledge, he must reconcile himself to ineluctable ignorance. He is the leading part in a tragedy, and he must act the part.*⁴³

On page 116 Rolfsen state;

The victimization of the US brought about by the terrorist attacks was what the US government needed to play with confidence its role as the only superpower left on the world stage.

How should one interpret such a statement? In footnote nr. 7 on page 117, Rolfsen claims that while he does not mean to imply that the US wanted the attack to happen (I am glad he makes the qualification). One reasonable interpretation is that Rolfsen thinks that it was *convenient* for the US that the tragedy occurred. From the US attitude and conduct after September 11th, Rolfsen is quite simply able to deduce that the US has wanted to perform these alleged acts of realism. How is he able to make this insight available to us? It is not entirely clear, but it seems to me that by this assumption, Rolfsen has made himself into a descriptive realist. Because the US has power, it really *wants* to use

⁴² I do not believe that one can construct a theory that is both empirically accurate and holistically embraces a universal ethical prescription. It is in fact an open question whether the moral, economic and political spheres could or should be integrated. On Morgenthau, Liska (1977: 105) once said, "the result was commitment to an analysis that is crude in appearance. But, when applied so as to detect the 'real' motives and define or delimit 'relevant' structures or configurations, it is also more incisively explanatory (as well as theoretically more elegant and parsimonious) than has been any of the competing alternatives. *It also cut sharper and deeper than did the sagacious reconciliation and syntheses of the major contemporary critic of Morgenthau, the late and regretted Arnold Wolfers. After all, when all the distinctions are seen through the underlying drive, Wolfers's 'pole of indifference' to power or, relatedly, policy of 'self-abnegation' with respect to power, do not change much that is fundamental. So describable instances represented historically either capitulations to irremediable insufficiency of power or else camouflages for a power superiority so overwhelming as to both permit and induce its effacement from explicit discourse and constant awareness*"(my italics).

⁴³ Morgenthau, 1962: 344, cited in Wæver, 1992: 48.

this power freely⁴⁴ – might is right, in Rolfsen's terminology. As far as I can tell, it nevertheless is a description on the present situation that is bluntly based on Machiavellism. At the same time, Rolfsen condemns this increased use of unilateralism by the US. As far as I can see, *his criticism on this point is analogous to a normative underpinning of political realism as prescription*; the use of force should be restricted to instances where national survival or the basic principles providing international stability are at stake.

Rolfsen suggests that idealism “was still balancing the dominant political realism”⁴⁵ through the 1990s. Realism, presumably, is the wild tiger now let loose to wreak havoc in the international arena. On the other hand, Rolfsen describes most facets of current developments in international politics as realism! Thus the

*victimization brought about by the terrorist attacks prepared the soil for realism, gave vigorous growth and made it blossom; thus shaping the form, not only of US foreign and security policy, but also of current world politics as a whole.*⁴⁶

Increased co-ordination between Russia and NATO is also seen as a sign of increased US unilateralism;⁴⁷ the crisis in the Middle East is a result of political realism; all is “partly” explainable through the “internal flaws” of the theory. In other words; *Rolfsen admits that realism is a good explanation and description of world politics*, but is it reasonable to claim that human misery is a result of realism as a school of thought? I do not think so. Foreign policy is never pure idealism, nor is it ever pure realism.

An alternative framework for World Politics?

I applaud all scholars who seek to construct an alternative to political realism as description of and prescription for international *politics*. Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is a considerable gap between practitioners and students of foreign policy on the one hand, and theologians and philosophers interested in ethics and politics on the other. To us empirical social scientists, and to officers, I dare say, such alternative modes of thinking about *politics* should seek certain

⁴⁴ At this point, he perhaps is right.

⁴⁵ Rolfsen, 2002: 116.

⁴⁶ Rolfsen, 2002: 117.

⁴⁷ *ibid*: footnote 7, p. 117.

criteria.⁴⁸ First, it should be rather consistent.⁴⁹ Second, it should be possible to check the theory on the phenomena with the corresponding, observable real world-phenomena.⁵⁰ Thus, the theory must principally be of such character that its basic assumptions and deductions can be refuted by empirical observations. Thirdly, it should be substantial.⁵¹ I believe that Rolfsen's "Ethics of vulnerability" (in contrast to his analysis of realism) meets the first and third criteria. He might argue that the second criterion is irrelevant, since his contribution primarily is in the field of ethics. But in that case, he supports Morgenthau's assertions about the autonomy of the political, ethical and economic spheres of thought. In my view, Rolfsen *has to accept criteria number two in order to present an alternative framework for thinking about security*. In the social sciences, as well as in operational art, military theory and strategy, we construct theories that simplify complex reality. These devices then help us understand parts of more complex systems or processes. But in order to construct theories and hypothesis, we must make our assumptions explicit; that is, make them available and open to debate and refutation. Morgenthau did just that in his classical work *Politics Among Nations*. Although Morgenthau was overly ambitious, it is clear that his aim was to see what scope and limitations there was in the construction he called "A Realist Theory of International Politics";

*The test by which such a theory must be judged is not a priori and abstract but empirical and pragmatic. The theory, in other words, must be judged not by some preconceived abstract principle or concept unrelated to reality, but by its purpose: to bring order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible. It must meet a dual test, an empirical and a logical one*⁵²

To me, as an officer with at least some training in the social sciences, theories that do not meet the criteria above remain purely theoretical constructions that cannot help us interpret our environment.⁵³ As Morgenthau stressed repeatedly, in the study of war and peace as empirical phenomena, we are forced

⁴⁸ What criteria theories should meet is debatable, to be sure. However, I believe that some basic criteria found in scientific realism are unavoidable for both students and practitioners of politics. One might argue that social phenomena are socially constructed, but that does not imply that these phenomena are not realities that can be studied as such.

⁴⁹ In other words, the theory should not contradict itself; a minimum requirement of consistency.

⁵⁰ I believe in scientific realism. For an interesting discussion, see Searle, 1995.

⁵¹ The substantiality-criteria is applied in a highly pragmatic way in the human sciences today.

⁵² Morgenthau, 1993: 3.

⁵³ Thus, such theories will only help upholding the distinctions between the moral and political sphere.

to make *assumptions* about human behaviour and the system we call society. Against this, the scholar of ethics will argue that he is doing *normative* theory. But in that case, normative theory will still occupy its own sphere, distinct from empirical or descriptive theories and research. I am a strong supporter of debates on ethics and moral conduct both in politics and in the use of violence by military units as ordered by the modern state apparatus. Thus, *Feltprestkorpset* should continue to raise questions concerning both *jus ad bellum* and certainly concerning *jus in bello*. I doubt, however, that Rolfsen's suggestions will help us to a significant degree in constructing a framework for analysing *security*. This is because its basis in the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas will make it a helpless victim when confronted with actors with lesser understanding and empathy for the "Ethics of Vulnerability".⁵⁴ How exactly should "a focus on (strength in) weakness, receptivity, vulnerability"⁵⁵ help us create a new understanding of security? Of course we are all vulnerable, but humanity is as a matter of fact divided into sovereign states that to a varying degree is supposed to give this protection. We cannot unthink this state of affairs. That some states break down only increases insecurity for their inhabitants and their neighbours. The central assumption made by Morgenthau was not that ethics was not part of political deliberations in real life. However, he maintained that at the time of writing, there did not exist any ethical theory or guidelines that could determine political decisions. Rather, ethical concerns must be balanced with the politically possible, as well as the effects of attempts at conducting a foreign policy that is "right" judged by a theory of abstract ethics. This has been evident to most political leaders in the Western world when faced with challengers such as Adolf Hitler or The Empire of Japan in 1941. Even when faced with such opponents, *jus in bello* is still important for several reasons. Personally, however, I do not believe that a theory of ethics all together can remove the imperatives of survival found in realism. Rather, ethics and moral philosophy complement political realism and the logic of expected consequences.

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Ondskapens filosofi

Lars Fr. H. Svendsen: Ondskapens Filosofi. Universitetsforlaget i Oslo 2001. 281 sider.

Indledningsvis fastslår Lars. Fr. H. Svendsen at vi lever i en kultur der er fascineret af onskaben. Dels svælger vi i den når vi ser film, dels har det onde og det ondes problem vakt mange tænkende menneskers eftertanke i tusindvis af bøger. Det onde er monotont, øde og kedeligt og gennemføres som regel af normale, anstændige og nogenlunde hyggelige mennesker. Der dvæler en tristhed uden lige over temaet.

Dermed har Svendsen lagt op til en overordentlig vidvinklet bog om onskaben. Som filosof tror han på oplysningsideen: at mennesker ved deres rationalitet kan nå langt i en forståelse af verden. Han nævner Baudrillards synspunkt at det er ved ufornuft at onskaben trives. Der er ingen interesse i at finde årsagerne til onskaben i det mystiske eller det metafysiske. Svendsen hævder at han vil blive ved overfladen. Onskaben er ikke et ontologisk, men et moralsk og et politisk problem. Han er ligefrem bange for at de mange teorier ender i teoretiske blindspor, og derfor gør han opmærksom på at bogens anliggende er mod det praktiske, væk fra teodicé og hen imod politik.

Onskapens problem bør ikke lokaliseres i teologien eller naturvitenskapen, knapt nok i filosofien, men i moralen og politikken.

Svendsen vier en væsentlig del af bogen til at gennemgå de forskellige teodicé-tænkninger. Dels præsenteres læseren for de teologiske, dels for de sækulare forklaringer. Der lægges ikke skjul på at forfatteren ikke finder det nyttigt at forsøge sig med teodicé-forklaringerne; men de gennemgås med stor loyalitet og forståelse. Den væsentlige konklusion er dog at enhver der fortaber sig i teodicé-spørgsmålet meget ofte forfalder til at bortforklare det onde og retfærdiggøre Gud - dvs. meget ofte er det ikke engang forklaringer af Guds godhed og retfærdighed; men simple bortforklaringer af verdens lidelser og onskaben. De fleste teologer vil nok læse afsnittet på kanten af en fornærmelse (der skal nu heller ikke så meget til at fornærme teologer); men egentlig burde alle læse dette afsnit for der er mange præcise læsninger og gode pointer. Advarslen mod at hylle meningsløsheden i Guds almagt er i hvert fald kærkommen - og et kan godt være at Svendsen ikke hjælper teologen på vej til at sige noget om teodicéen; men alene det faktum at han hjælper på vej mod at forhindre at der siges noget dumt, er væsentligt hinsides beskrivelse for hvor hører man dog tit noget sludder!

Svendsen går ind for at lægge blamagen hvor den hører hjemme, nemlig på mennesket og derfor skriver han afsnittet «Ondskapens Antropologi». Der findes forskellige menneskeopfattelser. Machiavelli mente at mennesker altid ville være onde hvis ikke myndigheden tvang dem til at være dydige. Hobbes så også mennesket som lukket inde i sit eget begær og i sin egen selvopholdelsesdrift. Den lærde Montaigne mente at menneske var disponeret for grusomhed fra naturens side. Men selvfølgelig var der også dem der mente at mennesket var født ædelt. Rousseau er nok den fornemmeste af fortalene for dette synspunkt.

For at nærme sig en begrebsdannelse om «Ondskaben» inddeler Svendsen denne i fire typologier: den dæmoniske ondskab hvor man gør det onde alene i glæden over at det er ondt; den instrumentelle ondskab hvor man gør ondt i et ædelt ærinde. Ondskaben er et middel og ikke et mål, den har ingen egenværdi; den idealistiske ondskab får aktørerne til at mene at det onde de gør er i en god sags tjeneste - ondskab trives sjældent bedre end under disse vilkår for ingen kommer i tanker om hvad det er, de gør; slutteligt er der den dumme ondskab som er kendetegnet ved aktører der handler uden at vide hvad de gør - de er tankeløse og eksisterer med et fravær af refleksion.

Samlet konkludere Svendsen at for alle typer gælder det at de kun fungerer når der ingen hensyntagen er til andre menneskers værd. Der er tankevækkende afsnit om det ondes æstetiske tiltrækningskraft, om sadisme og skadefryd. Der er velskrevne afsnit om Kants teorier og Hannah Arendts væsentlige studier i totalitarisme, og endelig ser man også Bonhoeffers advarsel mod dumheden lanceret som en væsentlig tekst - den dumhed som i sin tankeløshed gør mere ondt end selve ondskaben. Der er den hjerteskræende banalitet som kommer til udtryk ved navnene Eichmann, Höss og Stangl - de tre kommandanter for udryddelseslejrene som ikke kunne se hvad de havde været med til, men opfattede sig selv som ofre. Der er det frygtelige afsnit om ondskaben og de almindelige mennesker. Her ser man med al mulig tydelighed ved historiske eksempler og ved nye eksperimenter at mennesker kan få sig til det uhyrligste når bare de mener at de ikke selv er ansvarlige, men under kommando.

Det afsluttende kapitel omhandler ondskabens problem. Igen lader Svendsen ikke ordene falde fra sig og bliver en stor idealist. Han holder sig ved jorden og påviser at det ikke er gjort med at blive pacifist, for så kan man pludselig blive medansvarlig for mange menneskers

død. Igen slår han fast at dette problem ikke skal få lov til at hendæmre i tågerne. Ondskab skal ikke bare grubles ihjel; den skal bekæmpes med alle midler (til tider endog med vold). Han gennemgår i al hast teorierne om den retfærdige krig. Teologen smiler skjult for så var der vist alligevel noget teologien kunne bidrage med. Teologen smiler i øvrigt i erkendelse af at når ondskaben skal bekæmpes, skal det gøres ud fra nogle begreber om at ingen må slå ihjel, ingen må lemlæste, ingen må udnytte. Vi andre ville sige at livet er helligt! Filosoffen siger vel at livet er tabu! Under alle omstændigheder taler vi om åbenbaringsbegreber. Det er nu altid hyggeligt at opdage at samtalen er mulig på tværs af tro/ateisme/agnosticisme. Vi er sjældent så langt fra hinanden som vi tror.

Bogen anbefales varmt - det er et væsentligt og nøgternt bidrag og under alle omstændigheder er det vigtigt at få det slået fast at det er mennesket der bærer blamagen mht. ondskab. Den kan man ikke bare tørre af på metafysikken eller på de sociale omstændigheder - den skal bekæmpes!

Den bog vil jeg ofte pille ned af hylden og fryde mig over ræsonnementet og det smukke sprog.

Peder Skov-Jacobsen