Changing Sovereignty and Security Policy¹

By Dr. Janne Haaland-Matlary

There is a shift from interest-based to value-based foreign policy, it was argued in the debate following the Kosovo air campaign. The West intervened militarily to protect human rights, it was said. Some called it a humanitarian intervention, a concept much in vogue at present, but with a long history. Yet others maintained that this was plain, old-fashioned interest-based policy, seeking to consolidate balances of power between the great powers in the Balkans.

But they were hard pressed to identify exactly whose and which interests were being served by the risky and costly campaign. It was simply not plausible to maintain that the US made this risky and costly intervention just in order to enhance its power in the area, or that other NATO allies has this intention. As a partial explanation it seemed right, but it was not the basic explanation.

Values such as human rights seemed in this case to carry the upper hand as an explanatory variable. Massive violations of human dignity such as massacres, ethnic cleansing, and deportations were seemingly impossible to watch by the bystanders. The media reporting on the internal situation in Kosovo did play a prominent part in NATO’s decision-making. Exactly how much, will be discussed in Chapter Nine. But the point of departure is that values seem to play a major role also in exercising hard power, or the use of military instruments.

So-called ‘humanitarian interventions’ – or hard power interventions that are justified and perhaps really motivated by values – are not new phenomena in world politics, but in the 90’s we have seen more violent intra-state conflicts than ever before. Most wars in the present age are what used to be called civil wars before. Civilians are both protagonists and victims here. Modern media put the spotlight on these events in ‘real time’, and audiences all over the globe follow the same news. They naturally demand of their politicians: “What are you doing about this?”

The mechanisms of foreign policy have thus increasingly come to resemble those of ordinary, domestic politics: NGOs, media, and citizens act and launch initiatives in posing questions and demanding accountability from foreign policy-makers. Thus, foreign policy-makers have to react and to act. They are no longer insulated from the domestic political process, while also being subject to international pressures, constraints, and persuasion. In a certain sense the distinction between the domestic and the international political processes are like a ‘line in water’, to cite Kjell Goldmann (1989), and it has long been known that there are profound mutual influences between the two levels (Hanrieder 1978). There can be little doubt that national interests are determined by both international and domestic variables, and that the foreign policy excutive is not always the ‘gate-keeper’ between the two levels. Today there is growing evidence of transnational organisation of value-based advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1993) and of the role of global media in setting also national agendas. In addition, it appears that values and norms are transmitted mostly from the international to the national level.

With this ‘democratisation’ of foreign policy, there has arisen a great interest in human rights. The legitimisation of policy which is offered, is increasingly that of human rights and democracy. We ‘intervene’ in other states in terms of media support, human rights dialogues, party cooperation to develop multi-party systems, ‘shaming’ of recalcitrant states in international fora, economic boycotts of non-democratic regimes, and so on. There is a long list of such policy tools, and the list of states that do not claim to be democracies today, is short indeed. Foreign policy seems to gravitate more and more towards such values, at least in terms of the justification policy is given by policy makers. To put it simply: almost all states in the world today want to be accepted as democracies and as upholders of human rights. The states of the former Soviet Union and the CMEA also called themselves ‘democracies’, with the qualifier ‘peoples’ first. Today the few communist states left, such as Cuba, insist that they are both democratic and have a good human rights record.

But do such values as democracy and human rights really matter? Are we not rather talking about window-dressing between states which all seek to enhance their relative power in the international system? Is not the promotion of human rights and democracy just a convenient Western approach, concealing other, more sinister motives – the quest for national power?

My argument, as an academic and as a former foreign policy-maker,² is that values generally are increasing in salience on the international agenda, and that these values sometimes are the real, moving forces of politics – they have independent explanatory power, as it were. The hypothesis is that there has developed a human rights regime which is particularly strong in Europe, but which is universal in terms of content. This human rights regime contains democracy and the rule of law as the only form of government that is consistent with the implementation of human rights. There has been a notable shift away from the view that the form of government is a matter for domestic policy choice to the view that only democracy is a legitimate form of government. This study documents how democracy and the rule of law have become intrinsic to the human rights regime.

The values human rights, democracy, and the rule of law are embedded in different declarations and conventions. The UN’s human rights acquits is authoritative, especially the Declaration of Human Rights and the two Human Rights conventions of 1966. Later and regional documents all correspond to and are inspired by the former.

Values also seem to matter in the very few cases of hard power intervention. Security policy in the 1990s increasingly has to grapple with the dilemma of massive human rights abuse in internal conflicts, and the interventions authorized by the Security Council are several in the present period. Although not justified by reason of human rights abuse, the humanitarian situation clearly matters much in determining whether there is a situation of a threat to ‘international peace and security’, which is the formal basis for intervention by the Council. The old issue of ‘humanitarian intervention’ has again come to the fore of international security policy.

Thus, the role that the values human rights, democracy, and the rule of law play in foreign policy making merits attention, both as regards soft and hard power intervention.

Sovereignty: The Key Principle

It is not news that there is a tension between human rights, by nature universal; and the central defining characteristic of the international system, which is the principle of sovereignty.

Historically sovereignty has many meanings. Mostly we associate it with the treaties of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the 30 years’ war by laying down the principle that the ruler decides within his territory. In a Europe where feudalism had defined power structures non-territorially and where the Catholic Church exercised both temporal and spiritual power, there had not been such a thing as the nation-state. Power or authority had been defined along functional, not territorial lines. But the long struggle between emperor and Church on the one hand and the Protestant princes on the other was won in favour of the latter.

The Westphalia treaty made it clear that

to prevent for the future any differences arising in the politick state, all and everyone of the Electors, Princes and States of the Roman Empire, are so establish’d and confirm’d . . . that, by virtue of this present Transaction: that they never can or ought to be molested therein by any whomsoever upon any manner of pretence. (art. LXIV)

In other words, the norm of non-intervention into a state was established. In addition it was made clear that these principalities had the right to close agreements between them and with other states, thus making the territorial border the main political variable. The theorists of the new order, such as Jean Bodin, referred to this as the fact that the sovereign or prince is not subject to any other’s command. However, intervention continued to exist in the form of war, which was until this century a recognised tool of foreign policy (DUPI report), and there were religious minority rights recognised by the sovereigns in the period after Westphalia. These rights mostly concerned the rights of Christians in Muslim states, yet they were clearly accepted by all parties, and as such, relativizes the principle of sovereignty from its very beginning.

This principle of concentration of power inside a given territory however became the cornerstone of the international system, and is laid down in the UN charter. ‘Non-intervention’ is here made the central norm, as expressed in paragraphs 2.4. and 2.7. which state that the use of force against another state is impermissible, apart from the cases where military power is used in self-defence or where ‘international peace and security’ is threatened. The Security Council, however, has in the 1990s defined several conflicts as such threats – Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and to some extent Kosovo, which signals a new trend in international relations.

But if non-intervention is the key norm, how can we reconcile this with a politics based on universal norms and values? Human rights are per definition universal, and democracy and the rule of law are increasingly regarded as the only viable form of government. We see that some states will exclude any kind of ‘intervention’ based on such norms, invoking the principle of non-intervention. But we also see that an increasing number of states accept such criticism by trying to justify that they are both democratic and that they respect human rights. The norm of sovereignty has been changing over the last

The argument of this book is that norm of sovereignty is changing because there is a growing acceptance of intervention in the Western world. This is primarily true for ‘soft power’ intervention, but also seems to be true for ‘hard power’ intervention. We will trace the ways in which international organisations such as the OSCE, the COE, and the EU intervene on the basis of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

An Essential and Persistent Tension

While non-intervention remains an established norm that to a great extent defines what the international system is about, the notion of legitimate political order is another matter. Here we speak about how politics within the state is regarded by peer states and other actors like global media and NGOs, and how the ruler can justify his claim to power.

The question of a state’s legitimacy is thus not the same as the question of its sovereignty. The views on what is considered legitimate government have changed with time, and are changing. Despite this, relatively little attention has been focussed on the ways in which legitimacy works / legitimacy works (Cortrell and Davis 1996). There is growing evidence that norms influence the formation of state interests through diffusion of new standards and definitions of what is considered appropriate internationally.

This has implications for how the norm ‘non-intervention’ is viewed. To public opinion today, it does matter whether a regime is authoritarian or not; democratic or not. It is today increasingly accepted that democracies attempt to influence other states into becoming democracies, however with important exceptions and with a clear difference between the use of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power. Interventions with ‘hard’ power are reserved for the Security Council, and happen only in rare cases, although we have seen more interventions in the 1990’s than before. This body is the only one with a mandate in international law to use ‘hard’ power. But as the debate on ‘humanitarian intervention’ shows, also this norm may be changing.

The view of ‘intervention’ or seeking to influence within a state with ‘soft’ power tools is however also changing rapidly. There is now more and more acceptance for the need to establish a basis for human rights in all states. This is a phenomenon that has become manifest in the post WWII period (Sikkink 1993), and which seems to be strengthened with the globalisation of knowledge and the media as well as with growing multilaterism and the emergence of advocacy networks that are global. Such actors seek to have an impact on how issues are framed and defined in international fora. This in turns has an impact on the domestic state level (Sikkink 1993).

The Westphalian principle says that the state has a monopoly on the use of force both inside and outside the state. On the outside, the state shall refrain from attacking other states and is obliged to protect its own territory, mostly by having an army. On the inside, the state has the monopoly on the use of force vis-à-vis its citizens.

Today an increasing number of states are democracies, and the state therefore derives its authority and ability to use force from the people. The rule of law secures that force is not used arbitrarily, and free and fair elections ensure that the state is not despotic. Thus, there is no central tension between non-intervention and human rights in a democratic system that respects human rights. The rights of the individual are in theory at least ensured by the state.

Thus one can argue that the individual right to security of person, for instance, entails an obligation on the part of the state to implement this right. If the state fails to do so, one may say that it is an illegitimate ruler, despite being an elected or at least de facto ruler. In the day and age of democracy – essentially in this century – this is logical. But there are many states that are so-called ‘failed’ states, which means that the government is too weak to do much for its citizens, or states that are anarchic or dominated by internal conflicts. In such states the rulers do not fulfil their duty to protect individual rights. One may there argue that such regimes are illegitimate, despite the fact that they are sovereign states. The question then becomes: It is acceptable, i.e. legitimate to intervene in such states?

We can at the outset conclude that there exists a tension between the principles of human rights and non-intervention: On the one hand, we agree that the individual has rights that are universal and thus cut across borders; on the other hand, we accord the states themselves such rights, by accepting the Westphalian principle that the state has all power over citizens within its territory. How can these principles be reconciled if at all?

Power

Power is the key concept in any analysis of politics. Power is the means to reach one’s ends. The ends vary greatly. Sometimes the ends are the values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. Sometimes the ends are quoted to be such, but this is just a cover-up for other, more sinister motives. And sometimes the ends are conquest or simply to achieve more influence internationally.

A great deal of confusion arises when we confuse means and ends. There is nothing negative about power – it is the necessary means to achieve any goal. Power is the ability to make others do what you want, a standard definition tells us. But power is much more than this – it is also the ability to make others accept your own visions, values, and goals. There are thus many types of power, and we need different types of power for different goals.

There is a renewed discussion about power in the post-cold war period. As Ingebritsen notes, “international relations . . . have begun to focus on how states exercise influence in ways that do not conform to strictly economic or military capabilities. Instead of viewing the international system as fragmented and anarchic, a new wave of scholarship examines how states become socialized into an international community or society” (Ingebritsen, 1999, p. 2). Nye has developed this theme, coining the term ‘soft power’ as the power that persuades rather than coerces, and argues that the US is the leading ‘soft power’ holder also in ‘hard’ fields like security policy, where the future belongs to those that command “technology, education, and institutional flexibility” (Nye and Owens, 1996).

In the military field, they argue, it is the US that leads because of its ability to process and gain knowledge through sophisticated systems of intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance. This enables the actor to “use deadly violence with greater speed, range, and precision” (ibid., p.23), such as was evidenced in the Gulf War. The authors predict that with the leading edge in communication technology, the US will be able, “without commensurate risk, to thwart any military action” (ibid, p. 24). Indeed, this is what we may be witnessing in the effort to create a shield against missile attacks.

Nye provides a very useful continuum of types of power (Nye, 1995). On the most familiar end, we find coercive power. This power gives you the ability to command others to follow your will. Military power is the key power source here, but also economic power counts. Sanctions are one instance of this. But at the other end of the continuum we find co-optive power. This is the power to make others agree with you and desire the same things as you do. They may be induced to do so; through light pressures such as creating incentive structures that they follow, or through ‘shaming’ and open criticism, or threats of such. There are many diplomatic ways of arm twisting.

But as we move towards the right side of the continuum, we find ‘agenda-setting’ and ‘attraction’. These power-sources may be even stronger, for when you really manage to define a problem and set its agenda, then you have control of the decision-making process to a great extent. But still your power may be based on light coercion and pressures, although they are hidden as part of a ‘democratic’ decision-making procedure.

The most powerful situation is when you persuade others to think like you do and strive for the same goals. When they accept your problem definition and the premises for the subsequent decision-making, you have exercised the most important power resource: The other person is convinced that you are right, and he internalises your views. You have exercised the power of persuasion.

With command power, you must assume that the other will turn against you and disobey you when you no longer threaten him. With co-optive power, you obtain your goal – to make the other do as you want – without pressures and threats. It is obvious that this type of power is much more effective than the first. Communists, like some Jesuits, have always known this. Indoctrination means to learn a doctrine; doctrine means the ‘right view’.

There is nothing new in this. Power has always come in different kinds. Throughout history women have often only been able to exercise power through their men, in an indirect and covert fashion. Today there are luckily other power resources available to women.

Karl Marx’s analysis of structural power is eminent: power that you need not exercise is more effective than active power use. If you own the town, you need not use the ballot to get elected – it is enough to throw your weight around. The Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan formulated this in the famous phrase: “Votes count, resources decide”. Structural power is also embedded in social situations – everyone knows who is powerful, and they behave in anticipation of this. When journalists do not write about certain subjects, they exercise self-censorship because someone in that society has communicated that doing otherwise will lead to punishment.

The unseen power is hard to challenge. It may be personal power over others at the work place, it may be power exercised over economic resources and jobs, and it may be military and economic power in the international system which determine who is big power and who is not. When a big power moves a little, the small states jump. Some call it the ‘dinosaur effect’.

But what is new today, says Nye, is the salience of co-optive or ‘soft’ power. He argues that the US continues to be the most powerful state because it succeeds in exercising ‘soft’ power in addition to traditional ‘hard’ power:

Soft co-optive power is just as important as hard command power. If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow . . . In short, the universalism of a country’s culture and its ability to establish a set of favourable rules and institutions that govern areas of international activity are becoming more important in world politics today (ibid., p.33).

Can one have soft power without having hard power? This is a key issue for small states, like Norway, as well as for international organisations and regimes. I will discuss this in more detail in chapter 3, suffice it here to say that I think the answer is yes, but on certain conditions: A state with much hard power can more easily exercise soft power because of the ‘dinosaur effect’: Everyone listens. But also other actors – small states and NGOs, regimes and international organisations, can exercise soft power in particular areas where their knowledge and energy is applied. And finally, hard power does not translate into soft power. A big state which has no persuasive power will deter, but not attract.

Soft power resources enhance the promotion of values such as human rights and democracy, in fact, soft power relies on an open society with free press and public discussion. This is because soft power is typically exercised in public, as part of public diplomacy. The actors using soft power are not only states, but also NGOs, media and international organisations and regimes. The issues raised by the latter often concern international norms and issue areas such as human rights, the environment, humanitarian standards, detente, and so forth. Keck and Sikkink (1999) provide a penetrating analysis of the phenomenon called ‘advocacy networks, which are trans-national interest groups. They can mobilise power on questions that are related to values such as human rights – typically issues where right vs. wrong can be easily defined, and where the public can identify with a ‘just cause’. The point of departure for foreign – as well as domestic – policy, is more and more the individual and his rights, much more than states and their prerogatives. Multilateral diplomacy concerns itself with common interests or common problems, not with national interests in a narrow sense.

In the public sphere the justification offered for a policy stance cannot be just narrow national interest. It is not acceptable to argue that one is against an environmental measure because one’s national industry will suffer losses. Another explanation must be given, preferably related to scientific reasoning. Thus, science as well as human rights can be the source of political power to a much greater extent than before.

When discussing and negotiating in mulitateral diplomacy, the public explanation is never blunt national interest. There needs to be justification for policy stances which is part of the general discourse. If an international treaty is not followed, there is an expectation for an explanation that refers to a general phenomenon. One cannot say that one simply does not care to implement it.

Thus, the logic of public diplomacy is such that principled and general reasons must be given. These must be relevant to the issue in order to be seen as legitimate by the other parties. Many times the real motivations are naturally traditional national interests, but even so this has to be hidden.

What is the connection between soft power and values? We argue that values not only become increasingly salient as justifications in foreign policy, but also that they are real reasons for action, real motivations; at least in some cases. Furthermore, we argue that even in hard power interventions, like Kosovo, massive human rights violations have become real forces of action. But it is nonetheless probable that the most interesting connection exists between soft power resources and values.

This has to do with justifications. When human rights are invoked as reasons for policy action, it is mostly a policy by a state or a group of states aimed at conditions in a third state. It involved infringements on sovereignty in a certain sense: criticism, ‘shaming’, or monitoring – or more benign tools, like missions, aid and assistance. But in all cases, the object of policy-making is another state. Therefore it is difficult to employ hard power, even sanctions or boicotts of various sorts are very hard to establish.

But even in some cases of hard power use, values may play a real role. This is particularly noteworthy in the develoment of post-cold war security policy:

The new security policy agenda: ‘human security’

It is a commonplace that the agenda of international politics has changed after the fall of the Berlin wall. The world may be increasingly unipolar, but it is also multipolar. There are new issues on the agenda, also in security policy. The threats have changed – from Russia there is no threat of invasion, but of poverty, anarchy, disintegration, and mafia in addition to nuclear accidents, insurrections, and armed conflicts. One should of course add that the nuclear arsenal of Russia remains in place as before, and that the Russians still see themselves as a superpower. But there is no doubt that the power balance has shifted dramatically, and that security policy has changed accordingly.

There are of course national interests of a military and economic kind, and these are rather constant. But a host of new issues have emerged that are truly common to many states: environmental problems, conflict resolution and peace implementation, terrorism, etc.

Here there is no zero-sum game, but a possibility for problem solving that benefits many. The problems in the Balkans are common to Europe, and the many wars in Africa are a common problem to the whole world, and even more so to Africa. Environmental problems such as climate change are truly global, and require common solutions. Poverty, immigration, terrorism, resource depletion of the seas – all these are examples of the new type of issues where we can often not isolate any national interest.

The modern type of war is the internal conflict. More than 90 % of current wars are internal, armed conflicts, and in these conflicts civilians are the main actors – first and foremost as victims, but also as protagonists. Women and children suffer just as much as men. There are child soldiers in many of these conflicts, and they are fought with small arms and light weapons, with mines, and with guerrilla techniques. We have seen atrocities on a scale only matched by the Holocaust in Bosnia and Kosovo, and there have been and are armed conflicts in the Caucasus, a region bordering on Europe.

Internal conflicts: Why bother? Why are other peoples’ wars on the international agenda?

This has to do with the globalisation of the media as well as with people’ mobility. From a cynical point of view it is clear that states fear large influxes of refugees, but it is also clear that human suffering through the TV medium into your living room mobilises political action through reactions from the population. Thus, it is not at all easy to ‘shut out’ ongoing conflicts.

‘Human security’ refers to this emerging security agenda where the point of reference is the individual person and his or her right to personal security. This is a human right enshrined in all relevant human rights documents.

It is symptomatic of the present-day concern for human rights that also security policy is defined in these terms. Traditional state security is not being supplanted by a new security policy, but is developed into new forms that compliment state security as a result of the proliferation of modern-type conflicts. Both the EU and NATO are preoccupied with so-called ‘out-of-area’ operations, also called crisis management. At the 1999 NATO summit it was this kind of security policy that was the object of most of the discussion in the new strategic concept of the organisation, and it is the same topic that engages the EU in the process of making a common security policy.

These types of conflicts are now routinely labelled ‘human security’. The Kosovo air campaign highlighted the question of intervention: when and with which mandate is it acceptable to intervene in an armed conflict in another state? But all the attention given to this question misplaced the focus somewhat, because the major kind of ‘intervention’ that takes place in terms of human security is with soft, not with hard power. This is indeed one of the main points of this book.

The term ‘human security’ was first used in the Global Governance Commission in 1994. There the concept was used for a plethora of situations, broadening the security concept so much that it seemed to comprise everything. This, in my view, rendered the concept of ‘human security’ rather useless. But during the work on the land mine convention in 1996-97, the Canadian foreign minster Lloyd Axworthy proposed to work with Norway on ‘human security’, but defined the concept in physical security terms, referring to all types of threats that could harm the person. The first meeting arranged by Norway and Canada took place at Lysøen outside of Bergen in Norway in 1998, resulting in a declaration from 14 countries on the need to form trans-national cooperation on issues such as land mines, small arms and light weapons, child soldiers, civilians in war, on so on. These 14 states represented all regions of the world, but were selected because they were interested in driving this kind of agenda. For instance, in 1999 Canada, during its tenure as chairman of the Security Council, launched a debate on ‘Civilians in Armed Conflict’ after the secretary-general had presented a report on the issue. In the Spring of 2000, Norway, Canada, and Switzerland again arranged a conference with like-minded states within the ‘human security’ network, focussing especially on improving legislation on non-state actors such as guerrilla movements and on preventing armed conflict (sources). This ‘like-minded’ group has undertaken a large number of commitments to common policy in human security projects already.

It is clear that the states that are hosts to modern armed conflicts are often either failed states, where governments cannot provide basic security to its citizens; or repressive states, where citizens are endangered by the state itself. There is thus a need for international intervention, but this immediately raises the question of hard power intervention, i.e. military means. Kosovo was a case in point; Bosnia another. The issue of so-called ‘humanitarian intervention’ was discussed widely in the aftermath of the Kosovo campaign, illustrating the field of problems raised by military intervention and values: Could one intervene because human rights were violated? Ethically it seemed that this was acceptable and indeed necessary, but both in terms of political reasoning and international law there was not much enthusiasm for this concept.

The debate on ‘humanitarian intervention’ was one that combined all the elements of the ‘values agenda’ in foreign policy: It was felt that massive human rights violations could not be accepted, even if it meant hard power intervention in another state. Both governments and the UN Security Council rejected this notion, because there is no legal basis for intervention in human rights argumentation. But the secretary-general nonetheless spoke the General Assembly in the 1999 session about this issue, posing the dilemma of non-action by the Security Council: If it is unable to act when it should act, what about its legitimacy?

If also security policy becomes more embedded in human rights discourse and justification, it means that values have pervaded the very core of traditional foreign policy. It is often thought that the values of human rights are more salient because the international agenda embraces more low politics issues, such as the environment, women’s rights, and so on. Values in this sense are seen as appropriate there, whereas traditionally high politics – security – is thought to have nothing to do with such values. But this bifurcation may be wrong. If we find that values also play a key role where hard power is employed, it means that the mainstream, high-politics foreign policy agenda is transformed – in terms of rhetoric, but perhaps also in terms of explanatory variables.

References

Cortrell, A. and Davis, J.W. (1996). “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Norms and Rules”, International Studies Quarterly 40, pp. 451-478

DUPI (Danish Foreign Policy Institute), Humanitær intervention. Retlige og politiske aspekter, Copenhagen, 1999 (No specific authors, study presented by DUPI itself)

Goldmann, K. (1989), “The Line in Water: International and Domestic Politics”, Cooperation and Conflict XXIV.

Hanrieder, W. (1978). “Dissolving International Politics: Reflections on the Nation-State”, American Political Science Review 72.

Ingebritsen, C. (1999?). “Scandinavia’s Influence on International Norms: The Cases of Environment, Security and Welfare”, unpublished paper.

Nye, J. (1995). Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, Basci Books, New York.

. (1999). “Redefining the National Interest”, Foreign Affairs 78:4 (July/August).

Nye, J. and Owens, W. (1996). “America’s Information Edge”, Foreign Affairs 75 (March/April).

Sikkink, K. (1993). “The Power of Principles Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the US and Europe”, in Goldstein, J. and Keohane, R., eds. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.